486 Social Conflict, Harmony, and Integration
representations of group hierarchy.Social dominance theory
(Pratto & Lemieux, 2001; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, &
Malle, 1994; see also Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) assumes that
people who are strongly identified with high-status groups
and who see intergroup relations in terms of group competi-
tion will be especially prejudiced and discriminatory toward
out-groups. These biases occur spontaneously as a function of
individual differences in social dominance orientation, in
contexts in which in-group–out-group distinctions are salient
(Pratto & Shih, 2000). Scales developed to measure social
dominance orientation pit the values of group dominance and
equality against each other (see Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999). People high in social dominance orientation
believe that group hierarchies are inevitable and desirable,
and they may thus see the world as involving competition
between groups for resources. They endorse items such as,
“Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups”
and “Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.” In-
dividuals high in social dominance orientation believe that
unequal social outcomes and social hierarchies are appropri-
ate and therefore support an unequal distribution of resources
among groups in ways that usually benefit their own group
(see Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 1996). In-
dividuals low in social dominance orientation, in contrast, are
generally concerned about the welfare of others and are em-
pathic and tolerant of other individuals and groups (Pratto
et al., 1994). They tend to endorse items such as, “Group
equality should be our ideal” and “We would have fewer
problems if we treated people more equally.”
Sociological theories, in contrast, have frequently empha-
sized the role of large-scale social and structural dynamics in
intergroup relations in general and in race relations in partic-
ular (Blauner, 1972; Bonacich, 1972; Wilson, 1978). These
theories have considered the dynamics of race relations
largely in economic and class-based terms—and often to the
exclusion of individual influences (see Bobo, 1999).
Despite the existence of such divergent views, both socio-
logical and psychological approaches have converged to rec-
ognize the importance of understanding the impact of group
functions and collective identities on race relations (see Bobo,
1999). In terms of group functions, Blumer (1958a, 1958b,
1965a, 1965b), for instance, offered a sociologically based
approach focusing on defense of group position, in which
group competition and threat were considered fundamental
processes in the development and maintenance of social bi-
ases. With respect to race relations, Blumer (1958a) wrote,
“Race prejudice is a defensive reaction to such challenging of
the sense of group position....Assuch, race prejudice is a
protective device. It functions, however shortsightedly, to pre-
serve the integrity and position of the dominant group” (p. 5).
From a psychological orientation, Sherif, Harvey, White,
Hood, and Sherif (1961) similarly proposed that the func-
tional relations between groups are critical in determining
intergroup attitudes. According to this position, competition
between groups produces prejudice and discrimination,
whereas intergroup interdependence and cooperative interac-
tion that result in successful outcomes reduce intergroup bias
(see also Bobo, 1988; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Campbell,
1965; Sherif, 1966).
With respect to the importance of collective identity,
psychological research has emphasized how the salience of
group versus individual identity can influence the way in
which people process social information. In particular, the
operation of group-level processes has been hypothesized to
be dynamically distinct from the influence of individual-level
processes. Different modes of functioning are involved, and
these modes critically influence how people perceive others
and experience their own sense of identity. In terms of per-
ceptions of others, for example, Brewer (1988) proposed a
dual process model of impression formation(see also the
continuum model; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; see also Fiske,
Lin, & Neuberg, 1999). The primary distinction in Brewer’s
model is between two types of processing: person based and
category based. Person-based processing is bottom up and
data driven, involving the piecemeal acquisition of informa-
tion that begins “at the most concrete level and stops at the
lowest level of abstraction required by the prevailing pro-
cessing objectives” (Brewer, 1988, p. 6). Category-based
processing, in contrast, proceeds from global to specific; it is
top-down. In top-down processing, how the external reality is
perceived and experienced is influenced by category-based,
subjective impressions. According to Brewer, category-based
processing is more likely to occur than is person-based pro-
cessing because social information is typically organized
around social categories.
With respect to one’s sense of identity, social identity
theory(Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory
(Turner, 1985; see also Onorato & Turner, 2001) view the
distinction between personal identity and social identity as a
critical one (see Spears, 2001). When personal identity is
salient, a person’s individual needs, standards, beliefs, and
motives primarily determine behavior. In contrast, when
social identity is salient, “people come to perceive them-
selves as more interchangeable exemplars of a social cate-
gory than as unique personalities defined by their individual
differences from others” (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, &
Wetherell, 1987, p. 50). Under these conditions, collective
needs, goals, and standards are primary.
This perspective also proposes that a person defines or cat-
egorizes the self along a continuum that ranges at one extreme