The Justice of Retributions 5535.Displacing responsibility.Persons may deny their own re-
sponsibility by ascribing the responsibility for their actions
or omissions to others, asserting that they were seduced,
persuaded, misinformed, or forced by these third parties. A
special subcategory of this type is the displacement of re-
sponsibility to authorities who have given orders for the
action to be taken.
6.Mental retardation and developmental immaturity.
7.Lack of adequate socialization and education.Disadvan-
taged childhood and adolescence, deficient socialization,
and a lack of education are arguments frequently used
by lawyers to deny the defendant’s responsibility, because
these factors are widely believed to cause behavior
disorders.
8.Denial of having caused damages or harm.Even if the
person does not deny responsibility for an action or omis-
sion, he or she may deny the presumed effects of that
action, either by doubting the existence of any harm or
damage or by denying that harm or damage was caused by
the action or omission in question.
Apart from arguments to deny or diminish responsibility,
blameworthiness can be reduced by justifications of one’s
action or omission. Justifications do not deny responsibility.
Rather, they offer reasons such as the following that are
expected to reduce their blameworthiness and liability for
compensation:
1.Persons may make reference to their benevolent intent or
to the positive effects or benefits of their actions or omis-
sions. They may claim that any negative effects are bal-
anced out by positive ones.
2.Persons may assert that the victim had been informed and
had consented (e.g., to participate in a high-risk medical
research program or to engage in sexual contact).
3.Persons may legitimize their action as a just retaliation or
punishment. The victim is viewed as an offender who
deserves to be punished.
4.Persons may derogate the victim as being inferior or dan-
gerous, and may assert that their own actions are appro-
priate for this kind of person (cf. Bandura, 1990, on
dehumanization of victims).
5.Persons may justify their actions by referring to legitimate
self-interests, whether personal or communal.
6.Persons may legitimize their actions by referring to their
normative obligations or higher-order values (e.g., group
norms, obligations of obedience, religious norms).
7.Persons may interpret their action as defense of their rep-
utation (e.g., their face, so to speak).
8.Persons may legitimize their action by referring to con-
sensus information, either that “most people act or would
have acted the same way” or that “most people approve of
the legitimacy of the action.”Arguments to deny or diminish responsibility on the one
hand and justifying arguments on the other may be presented
by defendants (cf. Sykes & Matza, 1957, on the defense pleas
of criminals in general; Deegener, 1997, on men charged with
sexual child abuse), or by the defendants’ representatives.
Even victims trying to cope with intense outrage and hatred
against the offender may use such arguments to calm down
their emotions.
There is much empirical proof suggesting that the puni-
tiveness of victims as well as that of observers who were not
directly affected is dependent on the attributed level of
offenders’ responsibility; this also holds true outside the
courtroom.
In people’s sense of justice, responsibility and justifica-
tions do have much weight (Burnstein & Worchel, 1969;
Kolik & Brown, 1979; Shklar, 1990; Zillmann & Cantor,
1977; and others). In a vignette study, Schmitt, Hoser, and
Schwenkmezger (1991) distinguished six grades of responsi-
bility for an injury: (a) intended injury; (b) awareness and ac-
ceptance of possible injury; (c) careless action; (d) impulsive
action, forced action, or unforeseeable effects; (e) benevolent
action performed in a clumsy manner; and (f) behavior not
under volitional control. They found a high correlation be-
tween these levels of responsibility and the mean state-anger
scores of respondents taking the perspective of victims in the
vignettes. The perceived blameworthiness of actors may be in-
ferred from these state-anger scores. Montada and Kirchhoff
(2000) have demonstrated that credible justifications substan-
tially reduce victims’ anger at the offender, as well as the
degree of punishment the victims regard as appropriate.
Retributive justice requiresa valid assessment of the of-
fender’s responsibility and blameworthiness. The offender’s
own views of his or her blameworthiness must be given a
careful hearing. Giving voice to the offender is a central prin-
ciple of procedural justice; yet other’s views and information
by others also need to be included in the decision-making
process.Blameworthiness, Apologies, and RetributionAccording to the concept of retribution as atonement, a
penalty is just when it is proportionate to the degree of guilt.
The penalty is reduced, however, if sincere apologies by the
offender are offered. Goffman (1971) named the following