The Justice of Social Systems and Politics 555protests are often based on a one-sided subjective concept of
justice: Unbalanced claims—for the preservation of the sta-
tus quo, of freedom rights, of the equality principle, of the
need or the equity principle, and so on—lead to unjust solu-
tions because all other principles of justice have been vio-
lated. This idea may be illustrated by a few case examples
that are currently disputed.
Affirmative Action
Not seldom, efforts to correct one injustice result in the cre-
ation of another. A prominent example is the affirmative action
taken to correct the indisputable historical disadvantages of
women in the labor market, problems that still persist to this
day. For instance, women are still underrepresented in top-
level positions. Interpreting this fact as unjust discrimination
against women, various types of affirmative action have been
taken to give preference to female applicants over their male
competitors. The justice problem with this policy is that it aims
to correct a historical problem by reversing gender privileges
in today’s generation of students and young professionals.
Today’s young women have certainly suffered fewer injustices
in education and in the labor market than have earlier genera-
tions of women, and today’s young men are less privileged
than were their male predecessors. Therefore, it is problematic
for these historical injustices to be corrected by affirmative ac-
tion’s affecting only the present generation of young women
and men, with no impact on preceding generations. The ques-
tion is whether it is just that the costs of this measure have to be
borne exclusively by young men. Moreover, justice—at least
in terms of equity—is more frequently valuated at the level of
individuals, not at the level of groups or collectives. Therefore,
as D. M. Taylor and Moghaddam (1994) argue, many people
have justice problems with affirmative action policies.
This approach to correcting a historical injustice is based
on an implicit assumption advanced by the new feminist
movement—namely, that the gender categoriesmale and
femalewere in fact social groups. Would it not be a mistake to
believe that the whole group of women will vicariously partic-
ipate in and profit from the success of some—mostly already
privileged—young women? Women are not a social group,
but rather a social category. This distinction is psychologically
an important one (cf. Griffith, Parker, & Törnblom, 1993).
Individually, most women are members of gender-mixed so-
cial groups such as families, where they are bound not only to
daughters, sisters, and mothers, but also to sons, husbands,
brothers, and fathers. They may be proud of the careers of the
male as well as of the female members of their family.
This is not to deny the continuing existence of unjust
gender inequalities in the labor markets. Unjust gender
inequalities are recognized by many of those who doubt that
the concrete policy of affirmative action will result in new in-
justices. This is also true for affirmative action in the realm of
ethnic inequalities in education and in the job market (cf., for
instance, Bobocel, SonHing, Holmvoll, & Zanna, 2002).Environmental Protection PoliciesThere is little doubt that current and future environmental
pollution entails not only health risks, but also the risk of cli-
mate changes with incalculable consequences. There is also
little doubt that the current pollution of air, soil, and water en-
tails gross injustices. Because pollution is a side effect of pro-
ductive processes in agriculture, industry, and business, and
of traffic, air conditioning, and so on, the justice concern is
about the allocation of the profits, costs, and risks resulting
from these processes and activities. Some people and some
populations benefit more than do others from these processes,
and those who profit most are unlikely to be those who have
most to lose from the risks and disadvantages of pollution (cf.
the concept of environmental racism, Clayton, 1996).
The costs of pollution are still typically externalized—that
is to say, the costs and risks are mainly borne not by those
who have caused them, nor by those who have most to gain
from the processes in question. The externalization of costs
bears always the risk of an injustice. One of the policies for
reducing pollution injustices is the internalization of the costs
by means of pollution taxes. However, pollution taxes may
result in new justice problems.
First, there is no guarantee that the taxes raised will be
used to compensate the victims of pollution. In fact, not even
all of the victims of pollution can be identified because its
harmful effects are long lasting, interact with many other fac-
tors, and are cumulative. Furthermore, air and water pollution
extend across regional and state boundaries, and such pollu-
tion may involve delayed risks for the future when coming
generations may be affected by the greenhouse effect.
Second, pollution taxes may intensify social inequalities.
They may be ruinous for poorer firms, but not for richer ones;
they may be prohibitive for poorer car owners, but not for
more affluent drivers who can easily afford to pay the new
taxes. The result may be the bankruptcy of some firms, the
consequent dismissal of employees, and the aggravation of
social inequalities (Montada & Kals, 2000; Russell, 2000).
Looking at the branched systemic effects of every interven-
tion, it is not easy to avoid new injustices.Justice for the Defendant Versus Justice for the VictimThe principle of giving defendants the benefit of the doubt
is uncontested in criminal law, but the practice violates the