Aggression 571the use of such scripts is likely to result in unpopularity. The
resulting social isolation may lead to increased television
viewing, and an even greater reliance on the use of aggressive
scripts, eventually producing the habitual use of violence.
In Huesmann’s (1998) informational processing model,
people use a heuristic search process to retrieve a script that is
relevant for their situation. The use of an aggressive script
will depend on how situational cues are interpreted, the avail-
ability of aggressive scripts, the normative evaluation of such
a script once it is activated, and the interpretation of conse-
quences. Regarding the last factor, Huesmann pointed out that
if a child is beaten for aggression, the child may feel disliked
rather than interpret his or her behavior as unprofitable.
Although most researchers focus on the use of aggressive
scripts by delinquents, the scripts are as available for use
in international conflicts as in bullying and gang wars.
McCauley (2000) pointed out that while the least socialized
are more involved in personal violence, it is the best social-
ized who are often involved in the intergroup violence of war.
In fact, personal scripts are an aspect of the societal myths
that we shall consider when we deal with the concept of evil,
and Schellenber (1996) pointed out that interpersonal vio-
lence may be more influenced by the extent to which a soci-
ety engages in war than the reverse. Thus, Ember and
Ember’s (1994) analysis of the relationship between war and
interpersonal violence in 186 societies suggested that social-
ization for aggression and severity of childhood punishment
appear to be more a consequence rather than a cause of war,
and it is this socialization that is most directly related to
interpersonal violence.
Aggressive scripts are available for use in any social con-
flict, and if aggressive behavior is perceived as justified, an
observer is more apt to identify with the aggressor and more
apt to model the behavior. In the context of competition, the
goal of winning may entail a willingness to hurt, and this is
easily conflated with a willingness to hurt in order to win.
Paradoxically, the fact that context affects the meaning of a
behavior is an argument for Bandura’s behavioral definition
of aggression as that which results in (rather than intends)
harm. For example, bomber pilots often do not intend to hurt
civilians. Any intention to harm is embedded in the goal of
carrying out a mission, and attention is directed toward mun-
dane means (the pilot who carried the Hiroshima bomb was
primarily concerned that added weight might prevent a safe
takeoff).
Many social forces inhibit aggression, and Bandura
(1999) has extended his earlier work by examining how ag-
gression is more likely to occur when a person is morally
disengaged from the victim. Such disengagement may occur
by justifying the aggression, by using euphemistic labels, or
by using advantageous moral comparison. It is facilitated by
displacing responsibility for the damage that is done (as in
Milgram’s, 1974, experiments), by diffusing responsibility
(Zimbardo, 1995), and by increasing the distance between
persons and evidence of the pain that they are inflicting
(Kilham & Mann, 1974). Finally, moral disengagement oc-
curs when dehumanization prevents empathic responsiveness
(see Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975). Personally, I
would argue that we witness the contrast between moral en-
gagement and moral disengagement whenever we either em-
pathize with the struggles of an ant or step on the nuisance. A
scale measuring the extent of moral disengagement has been
used in different nations and shown to be positively related to
support for military action (McAlister, 2001).Emotional BasesIn Bandura’s work on the modeling of aggressive behavior,
the meaning of the behavior as intent to harm is implicit.
Berkowitz (1993) emphasized that this meaning may be cru-
cial. This becomes apparent if we focus on aggressive ideas
and emotions. If one person tackles another in a football
game, we may see the skillful, determined act of an athlete, or
we may see a deliberate attempt to injure another person. For
Berkowitz, it is only in the latter case that the model may
activate the aggressive thoughts and emotional reactions that
may lead to aggressive behavior. He pointed out that model-
ing is more apt to occur when a person identifies with the
aggressor and when negative emotional states exist. He also
distinguishes between instrumental aggression that occurs as
a means of achieving some planned end and emotional
aggression that is grounded in passion and is typically spon-
taneous and unplanned. The deliberate “taking out” of a star
player is quite different from a blow thrown in temper.
Berkowitz tends to focus on emotional aggression, which
he sees as pushed out, impelled from within, although this
impulsion can be influenced by external cues. He sees such
aggression as having both a motoric component (tightened
jaw and fists, striking out, etc.) and an urge to hurt, injure, and
destroy. He makes two major points. First, he argues that the
emotional state that underlies emotional aggression is not
only anger, but all negative affect. He shows that the discom-
fort produced by heat, cold, noise, overcrowding, frustration,
or free-floating annoyance lead to the increased probabil-
ity or strength of aggressive behavior. For example, when a
student makes a mistake, other students behave more ag-
gressively when they are in a hot room (Baron, 1977), and
they use more punishment than reward when they are in
pain. Riots are more apt to occur in hot spells (Baron &
Ransberger, 1978), and domestic assaults occur more