Is Buddhism psychology?: hermeneutic issuesSeveral authors have described the basic teachings of Buddhism as having
psychotherapeutic value. Frequently, the teaching of suffering (dukkha), as the result
of mistaken expectations of permanent satisfaction, is cited in this regard
(Young-Eisendrath 1996:2, and this collection; Brazier 1995:19). Another teaching
that could be interpreted as psychotherapeutic is the three characteristics. Realizing
that all of existence is unsatisfactory, impermanent, and lacking in any essential nature
to which one can cling (dukkha, anitya, anƗtmaka) may help those who hold
themselves responsible for the failure of their own particular situation to be perfect
(Lamotte 1988:27).
It would seem that being able to engage the teachings and practices of Buddhism,
or perhaps of any religion, in such a fashion as to benefit both self and others requires
a healthy ego, one that is both strong and flexible. Young-Eisendrath has stated in
connection with her approach to psychotherapy, ‘The first step in personality
development...is to come fully into possession of the experience of being an
individual subject—the ego complex’ (Young-Eisendrath 2000:433). What is meant
by a healthy ego is in need of definition, however. Welwood has pointed out that in
general ‘Western psychotherapy emphasizes the need for a strong ego, defined in
terms of impulse control, self-esteem, and competence in worldly functioning’
(Welwood 2000: 35). As a more appropriate definition, however, he suggests that
‘we define ego strength as the capacity to function effectively in the world, without
being debilitated by inner conflict’ (Welwood 2000:38). As I am using the concept
of a strong ego, it also implies a flexibility which allows for change without
fragmentation or dissolution.
In some cases, however, the assertion that the Buddhist teachings are therapeutic
seems to overlook the need for relatively strong and healthy ego structure that can
integrate the teachings and practices. Imamura, for example, dismisses the diagnostic
categories of contemporary psychotherapy as simply an instance of Western
psyehotherapy’s tendency to be ‘highly judgmental’ (Imamura 1998:231). In place
of such diagnostic categories and theoretical understandings of causes and treatments,
he seems to be claiming that learning the doctrine of suffering, or simple mindfulness
practice alone, will solve all problems. The likelihood that there are those whose
psychopathologies are so profound as to make them incapable of benefiting from
hearing the teachings or engaging in any kind of meditative practice is not considered.
Although Buddhism claims to address the suffering which is universally true of all
human beings, this is not the same as saying that Buddhist practices are all equally
appropriate for each and every person. An extreme instance of this is the Indian
Buddhist concept of the icchantika, those whose actions (karma) have cut them off
from any affinity with the Buddhadharma, and who therefore can never achieve full
awakening. This idea was rejected in later Mahayana and East Asian Buddhism, being
replaced by a teaching of the universality of the potential for full Buddhahood, i.e.
the Buddha nature inherent in all living beings (Shih 1990:159). In the hands of
some East Asian Buddhists, such as Shinran and Dogen, this idea was extended to
172 LOCATING BUDDHISM, LOCATING PSYCHOLOGY