comparable with a critical confrontation between a Zen Master and his disciple in
Zen mondo (question and answer)’ (Muramoto 1998:48, note 8). I agree with
Muramoto’s assessment, but further suggest that throughout the entire discussion
Hisamatsu is attempting to engage Jung in just this manner. In short, from beginning
to end, Hisamatsu is not only showing or explaining what Zen Buddhism is; he is
provoking, rousing Jung to awaken to it himself.
For example, immediately after the preliminary introductions Hisamatsu already
jumps into the fray by stating that he is asking about the final goal or aim of
psychoanalysis so that he can compare it with Zen Buddhism. Hisamatsu then queries
Jung on the relation between conscious and unconscious: Which, he asks, is the ‘true
self’? He pointedly inquires into the nature of dukkha and whether or not it is the
goal of therapy to free us from dukkha itself. (The Pali term dukkha expresses the first
of the fourfold Noble Truths so central to Buddhism. It has been translated as
‘suffering’ but is perhaps better rendered as discontent or dis-ease; in the conversation
with Jung, Hisamatsu used the common Japanese term nayami.) In spite of Jung’s
objections, Hisamatsu concludes by repeatedly stating that the true self has no form
or substance whatever. He is clearly speaking to—and from—what he is speaking
about: ‘The true self is without form or substance. Thus it can never be bound by
anything. Precisely this is the essence of religious liberation.’
Some of Hisamatsu’s assertions and questions may strike the reader as radical Zen
mondo at its best—or worst, depending on one’s viewpoint. The mutual linguistic,
cultural, and intellectual stumbling-blocks that arose during the conversation add to
the effect, occasionally giving the discussion, especially the earliest English translation,
a somewhat bizarre tone, described by one reviewer as sounding like Alice in
Wonderland (see Muramoto 1998:38–9).
Upon a careful reading, however, one may be struck by the fact that Hisamatsu’s
statements and questions constitute a dynamic, persuasive, and penetrating
presentation of the fundamentals of Buddhism: that dukkha is inherent in life, and
that there is, indeed, a liberation or awakening in which dukkha is eliminated at its
root source. While we need to be wary of monolithic statements about Buddhism
(and facile comparisons or contrasts with psychotherapy), I will try my best here to
present Buddhism rather than sectarian or dogmatic Zen. When presenting a
specifically Zen Buddhist position, I will state it as such.
Working throughMasao Abe, in his article ‘The self in Jung and Zen,’ states: ‘Although it is a relatively
new scientific discipline, modern Western psychology shares with older Western
spiritual traditions the affirmation of the existence of a self.’ Thus, for Abe, despite
Jung’s long and deep interest in Eastern spiritual traditions, and his discussion with
Hisamatsu, ‘there is no suggestion of the realization of the No-self in Jung.’ Jung, on
his part, refused to allow the publication of the discussion, based on what he
considered basic East-West differences—linguistic, philosophical, and psychological
—that would take years to sort out (see Meckel and Moore 1992:114–15).
30 A BUDDHIST MODEL OF THE HUMAN SELF