12 C. Robert Phillips, III
“primitive” while cults of the higher ancient socio-economic orders became
normative.
3 Training in classical studies consequently inculcated those biases (B1, B2). They
seemed not bias but patent truth since they arose “scientifically” (A3).
C Consequences of methods and conceptualizations (A, B)
1 Neglect of patent evidence that nineteenth-century British scholars considered
the three alleged fields of classical studies, anthropology, and religion studies
aspects of but one field. Likewise, utilizing Darwin meant that scholars con-
sidered themselves to be “scientific.” Thus empirico-positivism in classical studies
(A1) possessed competing visions.
2 Neglect of patent evidence that the circumstances of C1 differed radically in
nineteenth-century Germany. Only a minority felt the three fields (C1) kindred;
the immense power of the professors and their “schools” rendered such a view moot.
3 Neglect of the resultant intellectual competition as a result of the conceptual
differences (C1, C2), a competition marked by scarcely concealed jingoism. Scholarly
criticism, although couched in empirico-positivist terms, decidedly betokened
conceptual differences.
4 Unfortunate excesses in the study of Greek religion (A4), which led non-
specialists to dismiss any scholarship other than empirico-positivist. Those dis-
missals are not persuasive since their authors did not proffer detailed critiques of
the theoretical excesses but rather took refuge in vague, sometimes emotional,
generalities such as “forcing the facts into the theories.” This is perhaps a func-
tion of the empirico-positivism of classical studies (A4, B3).
5 Contemporary intellectual bifurcation. Too often classicists who would never
utilize the concept “primitive” in other cultural connections continue to use it
to characterize aspects of Roman religion.
6 Field bifurcation. Theory continues in religious studies and continues to be refined.
But scholars in that field left Roman religion to classical studies and do not demon-
strate the same interest in the Roman evidence as did their predecessors; likewise,
the formerly close links between classicists specializing in Roman religion and
scholars in religious studies have virtually vanished today.
Thus, while deplorable, it is understandable why there is no Wissenschaftsgeschichte
of Roman religion. It seems highly specialized to do Wissenschaftsgeschichte, but for
Roman religion one must attend not only to the Wissenschaftsgeschichteof classical
studies, but also to the Wissenschaftsgeschichteof anthropology, sociology, the his-
tory of universities, religious studies; thus the study becomes a specialty inside a
specialty. Further, there arises the issue of perspective. It is certainly fruitful to focus
on the various conceptual models in the study of Roman religion, and this enables
the detailed consideration of important details and gradations of interpretation. But
it is equally fruitful to shift the focus to how those models came into being, how
they were influenced by contemporary large intellectual and, often, historical con-
cerns. It is this latter perspective which the following pages would trace.