The Twentieth Century until 1960
By the 1920s the previous fascination with evolution as a means of explaining reli-
gions had largely run its course. Indeed, there arose a strong counter-reaction in all
the disciplines, including classical studies, a reaction which was largely occasioned
by the evident excesses of evolutionist theorizing; inside classical studies the ire devolved
especially upon the so-called Cambridge ritualists. But the counter-reaction was
curious.
Students of religion sought other approaches to understanding religion that ranged from
positivistic philological and historical studies of religious texts and communities to
phenomenological and hermeneutical “studies” of particular aspects or elements of reli-
gious belief, ritual practice, and behavior, and of religions and religion in general, that
produced what might well be called “virtuoso scholarship,” dependent more upon the
idiosyncratic ideas of the individual scholar than on the nature of the subject matter
and general rules of inquiry. (Wiebe 2004: 234 –5)But notice that only “positivistic... studies” and “virtuoso scholarship” apply to what
happened in classical studies generally and the study of Roman religion specifically.
Classicists remained, and continue to remain, albeit with scattered significant excep-
tions in recent years, innocent of and often hostile to concepts such as the phe-
nomenological and hermeneutical. From the teeming scholarship I select three items.
First is H. J. Rose’s summary of scholarship for 1910 – 60 (Rose 1960). The “idio-
syncratic” appears with the various works of George Dumézil and Franz Altheim (cf.
Rose 1934); there are sympathetic observations on the evolutionists Frazer and Tylor.
Far the most part of the scholarship Rose identifies falls squarely into the category
of “positivistic” studies, which he overtly considers the prime desideratum. Second
is Agnes Michels’s justly celebrated survey of recent trends; unlike the other two
authors, and most specialists in Roman religion then, she takes on its own merits
each theory and approach of the “happy chaos” (Michels 1954/5: 27). Her view
has much in common with the very recent words of Wiebe. Third is Stefan
Weinstock’s review of Kurt Latte’s Römische Religionsgeschichte(Weinstock 1961).
To his credit, Weinstock here and elsewhere does not reject animism out of hand,
contraLatte (Weinstock 1961: 206; 1960: 116 –18). To his discredit, he takes Roman
religion as a religion without belief. The bulk of his review, however, devolves on
the positivistic corrections and additions of scholarship and evidence. But herein lies
a fundamental problem of the field, a problem unresolved. If three notable special-
ists can disagree on the scholarship appropriate for Roman religion, where does that
leave the field and its place inside classical studies?
Recent Developments
Some continued earlier tendencies; thus Stefan Weinstock without apology followed
Mommsen (Weinstock 1961: 206; Phillips 2004), while Arthur Darby Nock
24 C. Robert Phillips, III