Conflict and Coffee in Burundi 99
number of deaths attributed to the two groups in these cyclical waves of vio-
lence has been a potent propaganda tool used by the ethnic elite. Some likely
numbers are that some 500 'htsi civilians were Wed, while the army killed as
many as 20 000 Hutus, driving a further 60 000 refugees into Rwanda.
What distinguishes the 1988 crisis from previous outbreaks of violence is
that the my could not carry out its b~tal repression without repercussions.
After 1988, for the first time, there was external attention, criticism and pres-
sure on the government to institute reform.
The Buyoya regime instituted political reforms toward democratisation
and power sharing in response to this pressure.43 They included the forma-
tion of a National Commission to Study the Question of National Unity,
tasked with enquiring into the causes and perpetrators of the 1988 killings.
This commission, as well as the reshuffled cabinet, the Economic and Social
Council, the National Security Council and the Central Committee of
UPRONA were balanced equally with Hutu and Tutsi members. A significant
number of Hutu were given administrative positions in the institutions of
state, and bamers to entrance into higher education for Hutus were reduced.
The commission's report was published in April 1989." The report mas
subjected to intense public debate culminating in a Draft Charter of National
Unity which paved the way for the Constitutional Commission, set up to
write a new constitution predicated on the Charter of National Unity. The
resulting document, the Constitution of Burundi, was overwhelmingly
approved by a plebiscite in March 1992. The new constitution provided for
free elections and a multiparty system. On 1 June 1993, Melchior Ndadaye,
Hutu leader of the newly established Front Democratique de Burundi
(FRODEBU), won 65% of the vote, compared to Buyoya's 32%. surprising
many observers, including UPRONA. The subsequent legislative elections
reaffirmed the magnitude of the political shift by giving FRODEBU 71.4% of
the overall vote (with a 97.3% turnout of registered ~oters)."~
The period in the early 1990s is generally acknowledged to have genuine
ly increased Hutu political participation. What was not challenged was the
culture of impunity for past killing of civilians in general and in the army in
particular. There was also no change in the Tbtsi domination of the army,
leaving the political minority with the monopoly of armed force.
Entrenched Tutsi elite felt threatened politically and economically - a
recipe for violence in combination with continued control over the army.
Politically, Tbtsis could not veto constitutional changes by which they felt
threatened, since neither UPRONA as a party, nor all Tutsi members of the
Assembly (most in UPRONA, but also some in FRODEBU) commanded the
blocking minority of 20%. Economically, the new government instituted and
planned to institute significant changes in policy that would have under-
mined entrenched elite interests. Four particular reforms and effects of the
change of regime are noteworthy: