Conflict and Coffee in Burundi 109
crackdown in the northern coffee producing areas shows how immediate the
connection between control over resources and violence can be.
The extent of economic integration between countries can often best be
seen when that connection is severed. This was the case when Burundi's
neighbours, under the leadership of Tanzania's former President Nyerere.
imposed sanctions on Buyoya's military regime after his coup d'etat in 1996.
These sanctions had the clear political intention of creating pressure on the
regime to negotiate peace and to return to the democratic process of 1993.
The combined sanctions of regional powers and the international aid com-
munity had a devastating effect on the economy, and especially on the rural
poor. From an overall positive balance of payments of US$ 1.1 million in
1995, there was a drop to a deficit of US$ 86.7 million in 1996.65 The World
Bank estimates that poverty doubled between 1994 and 1998, partly because
of war but largely because of the sanctions."
While the sanctions, once again, hit the poor the hardest, the elite whom
the sanctions had originally targeted soon evaded their effects through smug-
gling networks with regional business groups. President Buyoya's wife her-
self was implicated in connection with large sugar import fraud by a parlia-
mentary commission of inquiry in 2001. Some neighbouring countries open-
ly flouted the embargo. In January 1999 the sanctions were suspended, part-
ly because it was clear that they were not working and partly as an incentive
to encourage peace talks.
Burundi's economic dependence on the developed world is fundamental
to the structure of the predatory state. The two main mechanisms of depend-
ence are international aid and international trade in primary commodities.
mainly coffee. Burundi's elite has managed to turn dependence to their own
benefit through capturing the profits from international transactions and
passing on the risks to the poor population. On the other hand, economic
dependence can give leverage to international actors in the quest for peace,
if that leverage is used wisely.
The export revenue and domestic income in Burundi by far does not cover
government development and recutrent expenditure. Multilateral and bilat-
eral donors and development partners for a long time filled this gap. In the
period between 1989 and 1991 more than half the finances spent by the
Burundian government came from these sources and international non-gov-
ernmental organ is at ion^,^' averaging US$ 300 million annually, and making
up over 80% of total in~estments~~. In 1992 foreign aid made up 25% of GNP.
Large flows of aid shape the structure of the economy, often supporting the
predatory elite rather than development for the whole population.
The retrogressive effects of international financial assistance on the devel-
opment of the country's economy took various guises. Aid lowered incentives
to develop a competitive strategic export sector, leading to ineffective export
promotion strategies. Domestic savings remained dismal because external