Oil and Water in Sudan 217
assumed at this juncture is funher underscored by the fact that, after his
falling out with Machar, Dr Akol repositioned himself in his Shilluk home-
land.
Drought conditions struck again in 1995. The calamity repeated on a larg-
er scale the civilian suffering experienced during the evacuation of Ethiopian
refugee camps in 1991. Communities were dispossessed of their cattle and
removed from their fields. Famine and displacement, abetted by factional
hostilities, and the diversion of famine relief supplies culminated in a human-
itarian disaster that killed an estimated 250 000 people.
Dr Garang's statements and behaviour during this period did nothing to
improve his nasty image. Machar's manipulation of the donor-relief factor for
his personal benefit helps explain why Garang recently declared the southern
cause would have been better off without the NGO presence. Perhaps, but
the movement's meltdown enhanced the role of OLS and its umbrella of
NGOs.
The Fragmented Present
The deepening southern crisis marking the present juncture in the conflict is
best described by the 3 D's - displacement, dependency, and divide and rule
tactics adapted to south's fissionary proclivities. The situation evolved along
lines consistent with the centrifugal forces expanding into the vacuum. which
affected a corresponding shift in the institutional configuration.
The SPLA regained some of the territory lost to the government, but frag-
mentation of its pan-ethnic structure significantly diminished its offensive
capacity to local operations. The south remains a highly militarised re,' -Ion -
where the soldiers guard their home areas - until an entrepreneurial com-
mander musters enough resources and/or incentives to mobilise them for an
offensive strike. The SPLM top leadership hit a new low after its 1997 shoot-
out in a posh Nairobi neighbourhood, the rank-and-file devolving into a net-
work of competing ethnic interests. Local administration stabilised as a front
for patron-client ties fuelled by exploitation of timber, gold, minerals, and
other commodities.
The state of war prevailing since 1988 has seen the southern region
become a chronic basket case dependant upon international relief. The local
scope of NGOs as provider of services normally the province of the state
increased accordingly. Their importance on the international-grass-roots
interface reinforces traditional institutions of clan and lineage; unlike other
areas experiencing state entropy or collapse, most local Non-Governmental
and Community-based Organisations (NGOs and CBOs) are too few and their
capacity too weak to carve out a larger role for themselves.
The mainly Christian organisations that continue to assist the SPLA operate
outside the OLS umbrella. The NGOs operating under the OLS are at best