296 Scarcity and Surfeit
estimated to be around 250 million and is expected to reach 640 million by
the year 2025. The population of Ethiopia will more than double from its cur-
rent 60 million to 120 million, while Egypt's population is estimated to reach
94 million by 2025. This means that Ethiopia's population will be 20% high-
er than Egypt's by the year 2025. Increased demands for Nile waters may con-
tribute to greater interstate tensions as the different basin states demand larg-
er shares of the available Nile water supply, particularly in light of the
absence of a basin-wide agreement on allocating Nile waters at present.
The economies of the different Nile Basin countries are predominately
agriculturally based. Egypt's share of the agricultural sector as a percentage
of its GDP significantly declined from 34.3% in 1955 to 20% in 1990 as a
result of its expanding industrial se~t0r.I~~ In comparison, Ethiopia and
Sudan's share of the agricultural sector is still significant, amounting to 40%
and 36% of total GDP respectively. Over 80% of the Nile waters are used for
irrigated agriculture in both Egypt and Sudan, while Ethiopia has not devel-
oped Nile waters flowing through its territory, The agricultural policies of all
three countries are to attain national food security by increasing domestic
food production, mainly by increasing irrigated agriculture.
Since the agricultural sector is the largest water consumer, there are grow-
ing pressures on the already limited Nile waters, leading to competing
demands among Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. Currently, only Egypt has been
able to diversify its economy away from agriculture. Moreover, Egypt imports
two-thirds of its food requirements and this trend will continue despite efforts
to boost domestic produ~tion.'~' Egypt's current agricultural policy and the
economic viability of expanding agricultural production through reclamation
of new lands are widely questioned.
Instead, it is suggested that Egypt import 'virtual' water in food staples
instead of relying on current Nile water supply to increase domestic food
produ~tion.'~~ However, Egypt considers its strategy of increased agricultur-
al production as a matter of national interest and security and does not seem
willing to pursue a virtual water policy, at least in the short term. Both
Ethiopia and Sudan lack the capacity to diversify their economies in the short
to medium term because of their weak economies and current domestic
instability. They will therefore likely continue to depend on the water
resources of the Nile to boost their agricultural production.
In addition, the role of external actors in contributing to the potential con-
flict in the Nile should not be underestimated. Britain's presence as a colonial
power in Egypt, Sudan and in the East African territories (Uganda, Kenya and
Tanzania) enabled it to ensure the protection of Egyptian interests as the pri-
mary user of the Nile, mainly because of British strategic and economic inter-
ests in Egypt at the time.199 This was done through a series of agreements
with the upstream riparian countries aimed to ensure non-interference with
the flow of the Nile by upstream states without the prior consent of Egypt