60 Scarcity and Surfeit
Tanzania, with the aim of finding peaceful solution to the conflict. The negotia-
tions, initiated by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and facilitated by the
government of Tanzania, began in July 1992 and were concluded in August
- The Atusha peace process was the first major international response to
the war. The subsequent Arusha Accords provided for the following:
a ceasefire;
the formation of a broad-based transitional government with power sharing;
incorporation of the RPA into the army; and
return of all refugees.
In June 1993, just before the Arusha Accords were signed, the UN Security
Council established the United Nations Observer Mission for Uganda and
Rwanda (UNOMUR). The mandate of UNOMUR was to ensure that no mili-
tary assistance crossed the Uganda border into Rwanda.39 The United
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established after the
signing of the Arusha Accords and the establishment of a ceasefire between
the RPF and the Rwandan government. UNAMIR's overall mandate was to
support implementation of the Accords as well as to protect humanitarian
organisations operating in Rwanda during the transitional period.
Extremist groups within the government, notably the CDR and a faction of
MRND, were opposed to the Arusha Accords, which they believed gave too
much power to the RPF, including key defence and health ministerial posi-
tions, as well as large influence in the national armed forces.4" The govern-
ing Hutu elite began to undermine the Accords with the support of extremist
Hutu elements. In particular, the extremist Hutu party (CDR) did not partici-
pate in the peace process and was not included in the Accords, leading to
their armed opposition. At the time, the CDR was a major political force in
Rwanda. Adelman4I argues that the exclusion of the CDR from the Arusha
peace process was its major shortcoming. Only four days after the signing of
the peace agreement, 'ethnic' massacres began in Kibuye, for which extrem-
ist Hutu groups were held respon~ible.~~
The main lesson emerging from the failed Arusha peace process for Rwanda
was that zero-sum solutions that exclude some groups, no matter how strong,
are unworkable. Furthermore, the Arusha peace process focused more on the
ethnic parameters of the conflict while overlooking other important causes,
such as pervasive unequal land ownership, decreasing international value of
agricultural commodities and deepening rural poverty. However, effective
interventions in conflict are only possible when all sources of conflict are
recognised, and the dynamics between these under~tood.4~ The Amsha peace
process was preoccupied with issues of power sharing, elections and the com-
position of armed forces, all which were meant to diffuse ethnic sources of
conflict. Although these were important considerations, by not addressing