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ters organization, could benefit from KM. Mulcahy was a key reason the AFKM program
was successful.
Upon Mulcahy’s departure to a new job in early 2000, David Franke was appointed
as his replacement. Major General Michael Wiedemer had also become the new Director
of Requirements. Both were very open to KM concepts and the AFKM program, but
neither was as educated or enthused about KM as Mulcahy had been. Franke, to whom
Adkins primarily reported, was not sure that KM should be a centerpiece of AFMC
strategy. Franke saw the primary benefits of KM as coming from the building “of” and
participation “in” communities of practice. While encouraging Adkins and the AFKM
Team to continue their pursuits, he did not have a firm vision for KM or the AFKM
program in the future. He was also not sure that AFKM could compete with other
programs for additional resources given all the other AFMC priorities. All in all, it was
Adkins’ assessment that Franke simply didn’t see KM as needing emphasis above and
beyond other programs. As a result, Adkins predicted that he might have increased
difficulty getting the backing and exposure for AFKM that it needed to compete with
other AFMC programs for scarce resources.
Conflict with AFMC’s IT Organization
Dealing with the headquarters’ information technology (IT) organization, referred
to as the Directorate of Communications and Information, was a continual challenge. This
organization saw many conflicts between its responsibilities and the direction being
pursued by the AFKM System Development Team. The Directorate saw its role as
providing technology solutions; AFKM was also providing technology solutions.
Although the conflict had not escalated to an intolerable level, Adkins noted that his
Team and the IT folks “just didn’t talk anymore.”
Within HQ AFMC, the Directorate of Communications and Information had primary
responsibility for command, control, communications, computer, and information (C4I)
issues and execution. As such, it possessed sole authority for policy, procedures, and
standards with respect to C4I systems and programs. As the AFKM System Development
Team expanded its efforts, a conflict had arisen regarding collaboration software tools.
The IT organization had mandated and implemented LiveLink® software as the only
authorized collaboration tool. This action not only conflicted with the AFKM System
Development Team’s work on CoP workspaces, but appeared to be, in the Team’s
estimation, a much more sophisticated collaboration tool than was needed by the average
customer. Based on the AFKM Team’s in-depth experience, Adkins had tried to convince
the IT folks that an AFMC-wide LiveLink® implementation would be a waste of money
at this point. Although Adkins had hoped to work with the IT organization on KM issues,
this “disagreement” had driven them farther apart. Adkins stated:
We’ve had numerous discussions, but we have never been able to partner. So they’re
off getting everybody to do LiveLink®, trying to force everybody to do LiveLink®. I’m
off trying just to get people stuff to help them do their jobs better.
Knowledge of the conflict with the IT organization was not limited to the HQ either.
When asked by Adkins about his experience with LiveLink®, one of his CoP customers
had remarked, “I will tell you... you are on the radar warning receiver. They know you’re
out there and you are a huge threat to them.”