The Economist - USA (2022-01-29)

16 BriefingTheUkrainecrisis TheEconomistJanuary29th 2022

niscent of cold­war superpower stand­

offs, confirming the great­power status

thatRussiaseesasitsdue.

IntheRussianmedianato’s rejection

ofthesedemands hasshownthealliance

to be the aggressors and Mr Putin the

doughtydefender ofthemotherland.As

George Kennan, an American diplomat,

putitin 1946 whensketchingthebasisof

America’scold­warstrategy,inRussianna­

tionalism“conceptionsofoffenceandde­

fenceareinextricablyconfused”.

TheWest’sresponses,includingprom­

isestosupplymorearmstoUkraine,have

allowedtheconfusiontobedeepened.As

AlexeiNavalny,anoppositionleaderwho

MrPutintriedtohavekilledin2020,re­

centlywrotefromjail:“Timeandagainthe

WestfallsintoPutin’selementarytraps...It

justtakesmybreathaway.”

Thisallexplainswhysomeobserversin

RussiaseeitaspossibleforMrPutintolay

hiscardsdownandwalkawayfromtheta­

ble,reservingtherighttopickthemback

upata laterdate.Giventherisksthatwar

wouldposefortheRussianeconomy,the

fortunes of Mr Putin’s coterie and the

moodofthepeople,theythinkhewouldbe

madnotto.Butthatdoesnotmeanhewill.

His personal calculus may be different

fromtheirs.Heisbecomingincreasingly

isolatedandmaybeill­informedonsome

things,suchastheeconomicimpactstobe

expected.Hemayhavelostsightofthebig

picture—orhemaythinkheseesa bigger

picturethananyoneelse.

Partofthepictureisthatwhenin 2014

therewasa widelydiscussedplantocarve

out the whole of the Russian­speaking

southandeastofUkraineMrPutinturned

itdown.ControlofCrimeaanda destabi­

lisinginsurgencyinDonbasseemedlikea

good enough result. The Minsk agree­

ments, which were aimed at bringing

aboutaceasefire,requiredanewfederal

roleforthecountry’sregions.Thatwould

haveallowedseparatistsinDonbastohob­

bleanyWestwarddriftonthepartofthe

countryasa whole.

Butthe Minskagreements are mori­

bundandUkrainehasremaineda unitary

state.Althoughithasnotmovedtowards

formalnatomembershipduringthesub­

sequenteightyears,ithasbenefiteda lot

fromWesternassistance,militaryandoth­

erwise,whichlookssettocontinue.

AnindependentOrthodoxSlaviccoun­

trythatispartoftheWesternprojectisa di­

rectaffronttoMrPutin’smodelofanau­

thoritarianRussia;ifthataffrontistobe

avoided,Ukrainemustbekeptinsubaltern

turmoil,weakandcowed.Andalthough

Ukraineislessvulnerabletodaythanit was

in2014,itlooksunlikelythatitwillever

againbeasvulnerableasit istoday.Thatis

anargumentforchangingtherunofplay

assoonaspossible.SoisthefactthatRus­

siacurrentlyhasanimpressivewarchest,

thebettertorideoutsanctions.

Thereisalsoanargumentfromself­

preservation. Russian leaders routinely

conflateenemiesathomewithhisene­

mies abroad. A Westernplot to destroy

Russiawhichusesboth“foreignagents”at

homeandcatspawsabroad(theroleallo­

catedtoUkraine)allowsMrPutintopor­

trayhimselfastheresoluteleaderofan

embattledRussia.Thisisself­servingbutit

mayalso,initsway,besincere.Toquote

Kennan again,Russian leaders“haveno

difficultymakingthemselvesbelievewhat

theyfindiscomfortingandconvenientto

believe”.Andthoughitisnotexactlycom­

forting,MrPutinmaybelievethathisene­

mieswithinmeanAmericaanditsallies

areactivelyattemptingtogetridofhim.

InanabcNewsprogramme airedon

March17th 2021 MrBidenagreedwithhis

interviewer’sassertionthatMrPutinwas

“a killer”. Referring to evidence from

American intelligence that Russia had

soughttointerfereinAmerica’selections,

hesaidthatMrPutinwould“paya price”as

a result.MrPutinmayhaveseenthisasa

directthreat.Peoplewhoknowthepresi­

dentsayheisobsessedwithhisownsecu­

rityandassassination attempts.Months

spentina bunkerisolatinghimselffrom

covid­19maywellhaveaddedtothissense

ofparanoia.

TwodaysafterMrBiden’sremarks,Mr

PutinandSergeiShoigu,hisdefencemin­

isterforthepastdecade,wentawayfora

weekend. When they returned Russia

startedassembling troopsontheUkrai­

nianborder andinCrimea. Lessthana

monthlater,MrPutinpublishedanessay

aboutthehistoric links betweenRussia

andUkrainewhichconcludedthatUkraine

wasno longer asovereign statebut an

Americanbridgehead. Itisplausiblethat

heseesanattackonUkraineasa defensive

action,a fightforsurvivalagainstAmeri­

ca’splottounderminehisrule.

Notsinglespies,butinbattalions

If MrPutinchoosestousesomeorallofthe

forceshehasathisdisposal,whenishe

likelytodoso?Thewherewithalfora major

offensivewillnotbefullyassembleduntil

themiddle ofFebruary,says aneastern

Europeanofficialfamiliarwiththeintelli­

gence.TheRussianforcesmassinginBela­

rus—wellplacedforanattackonKyiv—are

expectedtoreachtheirfullcomplementby

February10th.Thatisnowtaggedasthe

startingdayfora hastilyannouncedjoint

“exercise”called“AlliedResolve”.

MrPutinmaychoosetoholdhisfire

duringtheWinterOlympicsinBeijing;a

warinUkrainewillmakegoodrelations

withChinaanevenhigherprioritythan

theyalreadyare.Ifsothatwouldsuggesta

windowofopportunitybetweentheendof

thegamesonFebruary20thandthespring

thaw.Thatsaid,thoughsoftgroundwill

make thegoingtougherfor Russian ar­

mour,a laterattackisnotimpossible.

Ukraine’spaucityofairdefencesand

theweaknessofitsarmedforcesmeans

thatRussiacoulddrivetoKyivperhapsas

easilyasAmericanforcesreachedBaghdad

intheIraqwarof2003.MichaelKofman,

anexpertonRussia’sarmedforcesatcna,

a think­tank,thinksRussiamightgosofar

astoencircleKyiv,takeOdessa,a coastal

cityduesouthofthecapitalandpartition

thecountry,leavingonlyitswesternfring­

esunoccupied.“Itwouldbeterriblyrisky,

andcostly,”hewroteinanessayfor“War

onthe Rocks” awebsite, “but it would

make Putin the Russian leaderwho re­

storedmuchofhistoricalRussia,andes­

tablisheda newbufferagainstnato.”

Asthecomparisonwiththeattackon

Baghdadsuggests,theprobleminthissce­

narioiswhathappensafterRussiawins.

OneRussian­backedthughasalreadydone

Moscow

Kyiv Volgograd

Odessa

Baku

Seaof

Azov

BlackSea

UKRAINE

BELARUS

Kaliningrad

POLAND

HUNGARY

SLOVAKIA

ROMANIA

TURKEY

LITH.

RUSSIA

Crimea

Controlledby

Russian-backed

separatists

GEORGIA

AZERBAIJAN

KAZAKHSTAN

Abkhazia

South

Ossetia

Vilnius

Minsk

Luhansk

Donetsk

Chechnya

Kharkiv

Suwalkigap

Donb

as

250 km

Sources:RochanConsulting;CSIS

PotentialRussianadvances

NATOmembers

Iskandermissileunits

Otherunitsthought

tobeinBelarus

January2

Russian troop

numbers

By base, Jan 2022

7,

,