The Economist - USA (2022-01-29)

TheEconomistJanuary29th 2022 BriefingTheUkrainecrisis 17

a  midnight  flit  from  Kyiv:  Viktor  Yanuko­
vych,  when  faced  by  revolution  in  2014.
There  would  be  little  to  stop  a  post­inva­
sion quislingfrom suffering the same fate
if, after the invasion, Russia left the stage.
So Russia would either have to break up the
unitary  state  or  accept  an  open­ended  oc­
cupation, one which partisans from west­
ern Ukraine would flock to fight. 
In 2020 rand, an American think­tank,
estimated  that  Russia  would  need  80,
or so troops to seize and hold tracts of east­
ern  Ukraine,  including  the  cities  of  Do­
netsk  and  Kharkiv.  A  larger  effort  that  in­
cluded  Kyiv  would  take  a  lot  more,  easily
absorbing even Russia’s substantial forces.
It  would  not  be  the  first  great  power  to
wade into such a conflict on the basis of ro­
sy assumptions about its course. But it may
see less risky ways to get what it wants.
This is one reason why Ukraine’s Centre
for Defence Strategies, a think­tank, calls a
“hybrid invasion” likelier than a tradition­
al  one.  The  cdssays  such  an  effort  would
involve cyber­attacks, disinformation and
psychological  operations  like  bomb
threats.  There  have  been  several  hundred
recent  bomb  scares  across  Ukraine  aimed
at schools, political offices and other non­
military targets. 
If,  by  demoralising  Ukraine’s  popula­
tion  and  exhausting  its  security  forces,
such  action  brought  about  regime  change

onitsown,somuchthebetterforMrPu­

tin.Ifnot,itcouldbecomethepreparatory

phaseforsomethingmoreintense.

Thereportalsomootsan“armedescala­

tion”intheDonbasregion,ofwhichonly

30%iscurrentlycontrolledbypro­Russian

separatists. Mr Putin has long claimed,

mostrecentlyinDecember,thatUkraine’s

government is committing genocide

against Russian­speaking minorities in

theregion.Theirprotectioncouldbeused

asa pretextfortakingtherestofDonbas.

OnJanuary26thVladimirVasilyev,who

leadsUnitedRussia,MrPutin’sparty,in

parliament,saidthat“Militaryshellingin

LuhanskandDonetskregionsisincreas­

ing,peoplearedyingagain,suffering,their

propertyisbeingdestroyed...Weappealto

theleadershipofourcountrytoprovideas­

sistancetotheLuhanskandDonetskre­

publicsintheformofsuppliesofmilitary

productsnecessarytodeteraggression,as

wellastotakeallnecessarymeasuresto

ensurethesafetyoftheircitizens.”Itisnot

anappealhewouldhavemadewithoutbe­

ingasked.Ifshellingweredeemedanin­

sufficientincitement,a “falseflag”opera­

tionmightbeputinplay.

ThefrontlinesinDonbashavehardly

moved inyears. Breakingthroughthem

wouldinvolvea substantialandconspicu­

ousRussianintervention.Butitwouldbe

smallerthana drivetoKyiv,andalsopossi­

blymoreacceptabletooutsiders.Antony

Blinken,  America’s  secretary  of  state,  has

said that “a single additional Russian force

[going] into Ukraine in an aggressive way”

would trigger sanctions. But not all Ameri­

ca’s allies can be counted on to take as hard

a line, and Mr Putin may think he is more

likely  to  get  away  with  expanding  a  small

war than starting a big one from scratch.

Despite some of these attractions, seiz­

ing the Donbas has a big drawback. It might

not  work.  In  his  essay  on  Russia  and  Uk­

raine  Mr  Putin wrote  that  “Kyiv  simply

does  not  need  Donbas”.  That  cuts  both

ways.  Taking  Donbas  might  be  a  short­

term victory, and in the context of broader

hybrid  warfare  it  might  bring  down  the

current regime. But in the medium to long

term it would be quite likely to consolidate

or  accelerate  an  unencumbered  drive  to­

wards the West by the rest of Ukraine.

A  further  possibility,  which  could  be

undertaken  alongside  another  or  on  its

own, would be for Mr Putin to use the forc­

es  he  has  moved  into  Belarus  to  consoli­

date  control  over  the  country.  Though  he

resents  it,  Alexander  Lukashenko,  the

president  of  Belarus,  relies  on  Russia  in

many ways, not least in his suppression of

the  widespread  protest  which  began  as  a

response  to  his  stealing  an  election  in

2020.  An  effective  annexation  of  Belarus
      might not necessarily trigger sanctions. It
      would leave Russia nicely positioned to go
      on menacing Ukraine. And it would allow

MrPutintoposea newlevelofthreattothe

Suwalkigap,a narrowcorridorwhichcon­

nectsPolandto Lithuania,andthusthe

threeBalticstatestotherestofnato.

Theinsolenceofoffice

Ontopofthemilitaryrisksarepolitical

andeconomicones.Theprospectofwaris

alreadysendingthestockmarketandthe

roubletumbling.Warproper,whichwould

triggernewsanctions,wouldmakethings

a lotworse.Therecouldbea catastrophic

runonthebanks.Becauseaccommodation

withtheWest,wherepropertyrightsare

secure,iswhatmakesitpossibleforRus­

sia’swealthytopassthingsontotheirchil­

dren,lastingisolationcouldbeveryirk­

somefortheelite.

Russianpublicopinionshowssignsof

dissonance.ThevastmajorityofRussians

blameAmericaandtheWestforstoking

tensionandprovokingRussia.Butdespite

thepropagandaeffort,Russianshavean

increasinglypositiveattitudetowardsUk­

rainians. Accustomed to seeing them­

selves as victims, they see Ukraine the

sameway:“America’spawn”.

ThequeasinessRussiansmayfeelatthe

thoughtoflotsofUkrainiandeathsmaybe

onereasonwhytheKremlin’smilitarism

causesanxietyratherthansupport.AsLev

GudkovoftheLevadaCentre,a pollingout­

fit,wroterecently,“AnordinaryRussian

doesnotwanttobeheldhostagetothein­

sane course of the country's leadership; he

cares about his own life and the well­being

of  his  relatives.”  A  long­drawn­out  war  in

which not just Ukrainians but young Rus­

sians die in their thousands would be mas­

sively unpopular.

Hence  the  belief,  among  many  in  Rus­

sia, that Mr Putin would be best advised to

press  no  further.Theproblem  is  that  Mr

Putin is not lookingforadvice. He will fol­

low his own mind.n

Go, bid the soldiers shoot

Russia and Ukraine, selected events

Source:TheEconomist

2021

Jan 17th Navalny returns to Russia and is arrested

19th Film about Putin’s secret palace

Jan/Feb Protests in Moscow and across Russia

Mar 17th Biden calls Putin a killer

30th Build-up of troops on Ukrainian border

31st Navalny hunger strike begins

Apr 13th Biden calls Putin and offers a summit

22nd Russia announces withdrawal of troops

from Ukraine’s border

Jun 16th Biden summit with Putin in Geneva

Jul 12th Putin publishes his essay “On the historical

unity of Russians and Ukrainians”

Aug 24th Ukraine celebrates 3th

anniversary of independence

Sep 17th Russian parliamentary elections

Oct/Nov Repressions in Russia intensify

Nov Build-up of Russian troops

Dec 7th Biden calls Putin

17th Russia publishes demands/draft

treaties with US and NATO

2

th Russia bans Memorial, a human-rights

organisation

2022

Jan 6th Russia sends troops to Kazakhstan

10th US-Russia talks

12th Russia-NATO talks

17th Russian troops arrive in

Belarus for joint exercise