The Economist January 29th 2022 Europe 27C
ovid-19 hasbeena mixedbagfor
Europe’sarchitecturaltreasures.
Duringthepandemic’sfirstyear,over
nightstaysbyinternationaltourists
droppedby68%acrossthecontinent.
Fewervisitorsmeanslesswearandtear
onmonuments,butalsolessincometo
maintainthem.Gargoylesarenotfalling
offcathedralsyet.Butwhileattention
wasdistracted,authoritieshavecarried
outsomedubiousrenovations.
TaketheAcropolis.(Xerxesdid.)
DuringGreece’ssecondlockdownin
October2020,builderspouredwide
concretepathwaysarounditstemples.
Authoritiessaythepathsimproveacces
sibility.Criticssaytheyarecausing
floods.Oneacademicaccusedthesite’s
administrationofusingthelockdownas
a “smokescreen”.
Atleastthepathwaysaremeantasan
improvement.Elsewhereheritagesites
have been levelled. In May 2020 Alba
nia’s government bulldozed the National
Theatre in Tirana to make way for com
mercial development. The theatre was a
humble modernist brick building built in
1939, but theatregoers loved it. Protests
had blocked the demolition for years.
Also felled in 2020 was the yBlock in
Oslo, a curvy concrete icon of 1960s
minimalism, though its Picasso murals
were removed first.
The latter two monuments had been
among the seven “most endangered”
heritage sites listed annually by Europa
Nostra, a cultural association. Its secre
tarygeneral, Sneska QuaedvliegMihai
lovic, says 2020 was the only year in
which sites on the list have been demol
ished. Whether or not city planners
deliberately took advantage of the pandemictoletthewreckingballsswing,the
distractioncannothavehurt.
Europe’sbiggestheritagesiterestora
tionprojectisinParis.Authoritieswant
torepairNotreDamecathedral,damaged
bya catastrophicfirein2019,beforethe
cityhoststheOlympicsin2024.The
church’sageandfamemakeit lessvul
nerabletoillconsideredupgrades:gov
ernmentsarelesscavalierwith12th
centurychurchesthanwith1960soffice
blocks.Crowdfundingmayhelp,too.
Tensofthousandsofpeoplehavedonat
edtotherestoration,andtheywantto
knowhowtheirmoneyisbeingspent.
Themodernisationplanshavetouched
offcontroversiesinthemedia.Allthe
better;asAthenshaslearnedthehard
way,publicdiscussionbeforeplansgo
aheadisa goodthing.ArchitectureLockdown knockdown
Whilecovidraged,famousEuropeanbuildingsweredemolishedWhat would Pheidias say?many’s refusal to arm Ukraine, or to allow
allies to do so, betrays a misunderstanding
of  the  concept  of  deterrence.  It  has  been
deaf to allies’ concerns over Nord Stream 2
(ns2),  a  completed  but  notyetapproved
gas  pipeline  from  Russia  to  Germany  that
bypasses  Ukraine,  depriving  it  of  leverage
and  income.  The  Social  Democrats  (spd),
who lead Germany’s government, are par
ticularly guilty in this telling. Critics spy a
party  stuffed  with  Putinversteher (Putin
sympathisers) basking in nostalgia for the
days of coldwar Ostpolitik, when spdled
governments opened up to the east. 
Yet there is little evidence that Germany
has gone soft where it matters. The govern
ment  has  signed  up  to  the  European  con
sensus  that  further  Russian  military  ag
gression  against  Ukraine  will  carry  “mas
sive consequences'', in the words of an eu
communiqué  last  month.  There  is  broad
transatlantic concord over potential sanc
tions, if disagreement on details. Germany
has  even  hinted  at  a  shift  on  ns2.  Asked
about  the  pipeline  last  week,  Olaf  Scholz,
the chancellor, said “all this will have to be
discussed” should Russia invade. His ns2
sceptical  Green  coalition  partners  have
been clearer still. Few imagine the pipeline
will begin operating if Russia does attack.
A bigger problem is the chancellor him
self.  The  three  parties  in  Germany’s  new
“trafficlight” coalition are visibly split on
Russia, and Mr Scholz, a taciturn type who
tends to speak in abstractions, has allowed
a degree of cacophony. He has made no at
tempt  to  prepare  Germans  for  trials  that
may lie ahead should Russia escalate, from
rocketing  gas  prices  to  a  refugee  influx.
Nor has he responded to Germany’s chorus
of critics. “This government has a terrible
communications  problem,”  says  Stefan
Meister,  a  Russiawatcher  at  the  German
Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin. 
That extends to the international scene.
A  comparison  with  Angela  Merkel,  Mr
Scholz’s predecessor, is telling. When Rus
sia  annexed  Crimea  in  2014  Mrs  Merkel
marshalled the eu’s 28 fractious members
to impose sanctions. Together with France,
Germany  established  the  “Normandy  for
mat” with Russia and Ukraine, placing Eu
rope at the negotiating table. Her chancel
lery coordinated closely with Barack Oba
ma’s White House whenever Russian forc
es  probed  Ukrainian  defences.  Today  Mr
Scholzis one European leader among ma
ny, Normandy is moribund and the trans
atlantic  relationship  looks  testy.  “It’s  not
that Germany has impeded consensus de
cisionmaking in nato,” says John Lough,
author of “Germany’s Russia Problem”. “It’sjust that it is not carrying as much water as
many of us would like.”
Mrs Merkel also enjoyed Mr Putin’s re
spect, even as she came to despise his lies.
She  discussed  Ukraine  and  eastern  Euro
pean security with Russia’s president half a
dozen times in her last months in office. In
his seven weeks Mr Scholz has done so on
ly once, despite the urgency. Mr Putin now
prefers to talk to America over Europeans’
heads. By weakening Europe, an equivocal
Germany  plays  plumb  into  the  Kremlin’s
hands,  says  Mr  Meister.  Mrs  Merkel
learned that Russian menaces were better
faced  down  if  Germany  ledEurope’s  re
sponse. It is an idea in whichhersuccessor
has so far shown little interest.n