The Economist January 29th 2022 Europe 27
C
ovid-19 hasbeena mixedbagfor
Europe’sarchitecturaltreasures.
Duringthepandemic’sfirstyear,over
nightstaysbyinternationaltourists
droppedby68%acrossthecontinent.
Fewervisitorsmeanslesswearandtear
onmonuments,butalsolessincometo
maintainthem.Gargoylesarenotfalling
offcathedralsyet.Butwhileattention
wasdistracted,authoritieshavecarried
outsomedubiousrenovations.
TaketheAcropolis.(Xerxesdid.)
DuringGreece’ssecondlockdownin
October2020,builderspouredwide
concretepathwaysarounditstemples.
Authoritiessaythepathsimproveacces
sibility.Criticssaytheyarecausing
floods.Oneacademicaccusedthesite’s
administrationofusingthelockdownas
a “smokescreen”.
Atleastthepathwaysaremeantasan
improvement.Elsewhereheritagesites
have been levelled. In May 2020 Alba
nia’s government bulldozed the National
Theatre in Tirana to make way for com
mercial development. The theatre was a
humble modernist brick building built in
1939, but theatregoers loved it. Protests
had blocked the demolition for years.
Also felled in 2020 was the yBlock in
Oslo, a curvy concrete icon of 1960s
minimalism, though its Picasso murals
were removed first.
The latter two monuments had been
among the seven “most endangered”
heritage sites listed annually by Europa
Nostra, a cultural association. Its secre
tarygeneral, Sneska QuaedvliegMihai
lovic, says 2020 was the only year in
which sites on the list have been demol
ished. Whether or not city planners
deliberately took advantage of the pan
demictoletthewreckingballsswing,the
distractioncannothavehurt.
Europe’sbiggestheritagesiterestora
tionprojectisinParis.Authoritieswant
torepairNotreDamecathedral,damaged
bya catastrophicfirein2019,beforethe
cityhoststheOlympicsin2024.The
church’sageandfamemakeit lessvul
nerabletoillconsideredupgrades:gov
ernmentsarelesscavalierwith12th
centurychurchesthanwith1960soffice
blocks.Crowdfundingmayhelp,too.
Tensofthousandsofpeoplehavedonat
edtotherestoration,andtheywantto
knowhowtheirmoneyisbeingspent.
Themodernisationplanshavetouched
offcontroversiesinthemedia.Allthe
better;asAthenshaslearnedthehard
way,publicdiscussionbeforeplansgo
aheadisa goodthing.
Architecture
Lockdown knockdown
Whilecovidraged,famousEuropeanbuildingsweredemolished
What would Pheidias say?
many’s refusal to arm Ukraine, or to allow
allies to do so, betrays a misunderstanding
of the concept of deterrence. It has been
deaf to allies’ concerns over Nord Stream 2
(ns2), a completed but notyetapproved
gas pipeline from Russia to Germany that
bypasses Ukraine, depriving it of leverage
and income. The Social Democrats (spd),
who lead Germany’s government, are par
ticularly guilty in this telling. Critics spy a
party stuffed with Putinversteher (Putin
sympathisers) basking in nostalgia for the
days of coldwar Ostpolitik, when spdled
governments opened up to the east.
Yet there is little evidence that Germany
has gone soft where it matters. The govern
ment has signed up to the European con
sensus that further Russian military ag
gression against Ukraine will carry “mas
sive consequences'', in the words of an eu
communiqué last month. There is broad
transatlantic concord over potential sanc
tions, if disagreement on details. Germany
has even hinted at a shift on ns2. Asked
about the pipeline last week, Olaf Scholz,
the chancellor, said “all this will have to be
discussed” should Russia invade. His ns2
sceptical Green coalition partners have
been clearer still. Few imagine the pipeline
will begin operating if Russia does attack.
A bigger problem is the chancellor him
self. The three parties in Germany’s new
“trafficlight” coalition are visibly split on
Russia, and Mr Scholz, a taciturn type who
tends to speak in abstractions, has allowed
a degree of cacophony. He has made no at
tempt to prepare Germans for trials that
may lie ahead should Russia escalate, from
rocketing gas prices to a refugee influx.
Nor has he responded to Germany’s chorus
of critics. “This government has a terrible
communications problem,” says Stefan
Meister, a Russiawatcher at the German
Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin.
That extends to the international scene.
A comparison with Angela Merkel, Mr
Scholz’s predecessor, is telling. When Rus
sia annexed Crimea in 2014 Mrs Merkel
marshalled the eu’s 28 fractious members
to impose sanctions. Together with France,
Germany established the “Normandy for
mat” with Russia and Ukraine, placing Eu
rope at the negotiating table. Her chancel
lery coordinated closely with Barack Oba
ma’s White House whenever Russian forc
es probed Ukrainian defences. Today Mr
Scholzis one European leader among ma
ny, Normandy is moribund and the trans
atlantic relationship looks testy. “It’s not
that Germany has impeded consensus de
cisionmaking in nato,” says John Lough,
author of “Germany’s Russia Problem”. “It’s
just that it is not carrying as much water as
many of us would like.”
Mrs Merkel also enjoyed Mr Putin’s re
spect, even as she came to despise his lies.
She discussed Ukraine and eastern Euro
pean security with Russia’s president half a
dozen times in her last months in office. In
his seven weeks Mr Scholz has done so on
ly once, despite the urgency. Mr Putin now
prefers to talk to America over Europeans’
heads. By weakening Europe, an equivocal
Germany plays plumb into the Kremlin’s
hands, says Mr Meister. Mrs Merkel
learned that Russian menaces were better
faced down if Germany ledEurope’s re
sponse. It is an idea in whichhersuccessor
has so far shown little interest.n