8 TechnologyQuarterlyDefencetechnology TheEconomistJanuary29th 2022
merous, they might be able to do more detecting themselves. The
sensors available for such arrays have improved greatly, according
to Bryan Clark, a former submariner now at the Hudson Institute,
a thinktank in Washington. New solidstate “vector” sensors
measure the velocity and acceleration of water molecules, which
means they get more information out of a sound wave than a sim
ply pressuresensitive hydrophone does. The signalprocessing
systems required to discern a submarine’s screw in the din of the
ocean are improving even more quickly.
They are also shrinking. Ken Perry, a retired rearadmiral and
vicepresident of ThayerMahan, a Connecticutbased firm which
builds maritimesurveillance platforms, recalls a time when so
nar computers were so large and inefficient that submariners
warmed up their coffee on them. Now a surfboard’s worth of solar
panels can run them and still provide enough juice to transmit the
information thus produced. Hence the interest in things like Wave
Gliders and ThayerMahan’s rather larger usvs, which carry ten
times the payload capacity and move a lot quicker.
A fleet of arraytowing usvs could cover millions of square ki
lometres of ocean for “a fraction of the cost of a single frigate or
submarine”, says Mr Perry, whose company has tested the concept
in exercises with America’s navy. The bit of the Pentagon charged
with pushing technological boundaries, darpa, is working on an
“Ocean of Things” project which would contain thousands of
“lowcost floats...that drift as a distributed sensor network”. The
idea is that armadas of prowling hydrophones could eventually
plug into a wider network of sensors, including fixed arrays, sono
buoysdroppedfromtheairandautonomousunderwatervehicles
(auvs)—dronesubmarines.
Anotherdarpaprojecthasworkedonnewwaystofollowup
suchdetections.In 2016 itproducedausvcalledSeaHunter, a ro
botprototypedesignedtofollowa submarineforthousandsofki
lometresentirelyautonomouslywhilerespectingalltheinterna
tionalrulesdesignedtoavoidcollisionsatsea.Suchvessels,a lot
biggerthanmostsurfacedronesbutmuchsmaller,andfarcheap
er,thana frigatewitha crew,couldintheorybedeployedinfairly
largenumbers,andincontestedwaters.
WhateverhappenedtoJonesy?
Anoceanthatissuffusedwithsensorsaboveandbelowthesur
faceandwhichhassubtrackingrobotsontheprowliscertainlya
moreinhospitableplacefora submarine—oratleast,foronethat
doesnotbelongto Americaor oneofitsallies.Floodingthe
world’soceanswithsuchsensorsissomethingonlya greatpower
cando.Asfarasmostpeopleareconcerned,saysMrCote,“the
oceansareopaque,andwillprobablyremainso.”
Changingthiswouldrequiresomenewtechniquetosupple
mentwhatisavailable,andthereislotsofresearchondetecting
magneticdisturbancesandveryfaintwakes,sniffingouttelltale
chemicalsorradiation,andpingingtargetswithlaserstunedto
thebluegreenwavelengthswhichbestpenetrateseawater.Some
ofthesetechniquesmightworkbestunderwater.Picturesofcuri
ousappendagesthatmightholdsensorsofvarioussortsonsub
marinescomingintoorleavingportreliablysparkdiscussionin
thesubcuriouspartsoftheinternet.Otherscouldbedeployed
fromaerialdrones,andthuscouldbeusedalotmoreifsuch
dronesbecamemorenumerous.Butshortrangeslooklikelytore
maina problemforallthesemethods,asdoesthefundamental
challengeofseparatingsignalfromnoiseinbigmessyoceans.
Andsubmarinerscouldfightback,notesDavidBlagdenofthe
UniversityofExeter.A submarineleavingportmight“delouse”it
selfofinquisitiveusvs byusingtechnologyasrudimentaryasa
tugboatandropenetting.Shouldwakedetectionshowpromise,
submarinescouldsimplyheadtorougherseas.Thelowpower
transmissionsfromusvs tosatellitesornearbywarshipscouldbe
jammedbyotherusvs,orbydrones.
The last of those tactics speaks to a perennial problem for anti
submarine warfare. The oceans do not just make it hard to gather
information; they also make it hard to pass it on. Sensors which
spend all their time submerged have either to be hard wired to ca
bles or to communicate using acoustic modems that are slow,
cumbersome and limited in range. This is a real bottleneck for sys
tems trying to make use of auvs.
This requirement for cables on the sea floor makes geography
important. Navies fight above the seabed they have, not the one
they would like. In the North Atlantic, America enjoyed the advan
tage of laying its cables in very deep water—inaccessible to all but
highly specialised submarines—and then up a continental shelf
that rose, sharply, on to allied territory. By contrast, if China want
ed to assemble a sonar net across the Philippine Sea, it would have
to lay fibreoptic cable all across the South China Sea, bits of which
are shallow enough that cables there are frequently cut by fishing
vessels. Those cables would be at the mercy of foreign navies. .
That could make it hard for China to stop submarines getting
close to its shores. And sonar systems at choke points like the Lu
zon Strait could make it difficult for Chinese submarines to slip
into the open ocean. Both constraints would be to its disadvantage
in wartime. But they would not render its ssbns useless. Such sub
marines do not need to be able to prowl every ocean with impuni
ty. They just need an area within range of their missiles’ targets but
out of bounds to other navies and their sensors—what navies call a
“bastion”. Seeing through an ocean will be hardenough if you have
access to its surface and its depths. Seeing througha sea you can be
kept out of is a different kettle of invisible fish.n
3mWaveGlider
20mSeaGuardian(UAV)
Variable
depth
sonar
Source:The Economist
40mSeaHunterfromDARPA's
ASWContinuousTrailUnmanned
Vessel(ACTUV)project
150mVanguard-classsubmarine(SSBN)
2.m
AutonomousUnderwater Vehicle (AUV)
150m Type 2 frigate
Sub-huntinghelicopter
Welcome to the new world, Captain
Selected platforms for anti-submarine warfare
By length, metres