The Economist January 29th 2022 Middle East & Africa 43
ThewarinYemen
UAVs over the UAE
A
ftersevenyearsoffightinginYemen,
theroarandthumpofmissileinter
ceptorsisa familiarsoundinSaudiArabia.
Butit wasa shockforresidentsoftheUnit
edArabEmirates(uae).EarlyonJanuary
24ththeuaesaidit hadshotdowna pairof
ballisticmissilesfiredfromYemen.Videos
posted on social media captured loud
boomsoverAbuDhabi,thecapital.
The Houthis,anIranianbackedmili
tantgroupthatcontrols partofYemen,
claimed responsibility. Since 2015 they
havebeenfightinga coalitionledbySaudi
Arabia,andincludingtheuae, whichin
vadedYementodeposethem.Aweekbe
fore the missile attack, the Houthis
launchedadroneattack onAbuDhabi’s
airportandanindustrialarea.Threework
ersfromIndiaandPakistanwerekilled.
Thatattacktriggereda ferociouswave
ofSaudiandEmiratiairstrikesinYemen,
manyofwhichkilledcivilians.Thedeadli
est,onJanuary21st,hita prisoninSaada,a
northerncity.MédecinsSansFrontières,a
medicalcharitywithemployeesthere,said
atleast 82 peoplewerekilled(pictured).A
separatestrikeona telecomsfacilityinHo
deidadisconnectedYemenfromtheinter
netforfourdays.
Houthiattackshavebecomecommon
inSaudiArabia,whichshootsdownmis
silesordronesalmosteveryweek.Thiswas
thefirsttimetheHouthishadsuccessfully
targetedtheuae. Itreflectstheirfuryatan
abruptbattlefieldreversalinYemen,engi
neeredbytheEmiratis.Anditpresentsthe
uaewitha difficultchoice:tobackoff,al
lowingtheHouthistocaptureanimpor
tantcity,ortoriskmoreattacksthatcould
inflictrealdamageonitseconomy.
Formorethana yearthemainfrontline
inYemenhasbeenaroundthecityofMa
rib,120km(75miles)eastofSana’a,thecap
ital.Itishometo3mpeople,onethirdof
themdisplacedfromotherregions,andto
Yemen’slargestoilandgasreserves.The
Houthishavethrownwavesoffightersat
the city, including children. Casualties
havebeenhorrific,buttheyhaveslowly
worndownthecity’sdefenders.
Theuaehadlittletodowiththis.In
2019 itwithdrewmostofitstroopsfroma
warithadcometoseeasa quagmire.Emi
ratishadfoughtlargelyinsouthYemen,
whichwasanindependentcountryuntil
1990 andretainsa secessioniststreak.The
Houthis havelittle supportthere. Fora
timeitseemedtheEmiratiswerepursuing
defactopartition:theywouldmaintain a
sphereofinfluenceinthesouth,while the
Saudibacked and internationally recog
nised government struggled against the
Houthisinthenorth.
Lastyear,however,theHouthisinvaded
Shabwa, an energyrich southern prov
ince.WithMaribteeteringandthesouth
underthreat,thecoalitionchangedtactics.
OnDecember25thSaudiArabiaagreed to
sackthegovernorofShabwa,a controver
sialfigureaffiliatedwithIslah,anIslamist
partydislikedbytheEmiratis.Hisreplace
ment,atribalfigure,hasgoodrelations
withtheuae(wherehelivedforyears).
TheGiantsBrigades,a militiabacked by
theuae, thenmovedthousandsofitsfight
ersfromtheRedSeacoasttoShabwa. Their
gainswereswift:theypushedtheHouthis
outofShabwaandwentontoseizebits of
Maribprovinceaswell.Battlefieldvicto
riesinYemenarenotalwaysdurable. Still,
theHouthishavesuffereda bigsetback in
thepastfewweeks.Insteadofa seemingly
inexorablemarchtoseizeMarib,they now
facea newthreatontheirsouthernflank.
TheattacksonAbuDhabiwerean ulti
matumtotheuae: haltyouradvance or
facefurtherbombardment. Thephysical
danger is modest. Houthi missiles and
dronescannotcarrybigpayloads,and the
uaehasadvancedairdefences—bolstered
byAmerica,whichhasthousandsoftroops
atalDhafra,anairbasesouthofAbuDhabi
(theyfiredtheirownairdefencesystems
attheHouthimissilesonJanuary24th).
The reputational risk is far greater. The
uaemarkets itself as an oasis of stability,
seemingly immune to the region’s con
flicts, even as it has pursued an aggressive
foreign policy that embroiled it in them.
Investors view it as a safe place to start a
business or buy property. The 22m tourists
who visited in 2019 had little to worry
about beyond sunburn or some bad oysters
at brunch. Continued attacks would jeop
ardise that image.
They could also complicate the uae’s
recent efforts at rapprochement with Iran.
Tahnoun bin Zayed, the national security
adviser, visited Tehran in December. Ebra
him Raisi, Iran’s president, has been invit
ed to visit Abu Dhabi. The uae hoped
friendlier ties would allow it to avoid ex
actly these sorts of attacks. The Houthis are
not fully an Iranian proxy—they often act
independently. But the attacks on the uae
were made possible by Iranian support.
The drones and missiles aimed at Abu Dha
bi were probably based on Iranian designs.
Now the uaemust decide whether to
press forward or pull back in Yemen. It
could reach a deal with the Houthis to keep
the Giants Brigades in Shabwa as a defen
sive force. If Marib falls, however, Shabwa
would become more vulnerable. The
Houthis could also force the uae’s hand.
They have threatened strikes on Dubai, the
uae’s business and tourism hub; on Janu
ary 25th a spokesman for the group warned
visitors to avoid Expo 2020, the world’s fair
that opened in October.
Such attacks would be a serious escala
tion, which would probably draw the uae
deeper into the war—and perhaps also
America, which last year ended support for
“offensive operations” by the coalition. All
of this, then, could backfire on the Houth
is. They benefited from the withdrawal of
the uae, with the coalition’s most capable
army. Trying to keep the Emiratis out,the
Houthis could instead pull them back in.n
D UBAI
Strikes on the United Arab Emirates may backfire on the Houthi rebels
No end to the suffering in Yemen