The Economist January 29th 2022 Middle East & Africa 43ThewarinYemenUAVs over the UAE
A
ftersevenyearsoffightinginYemen,
theroarandthumpofmissileinter
ceptorsisa familiarsoundinSaudiArabia.
Butit wasa shockforresidentsoftheUnit
edArabEmirates(uae).EarlyonJanuary
24ththeuaesaidit hadshotdowna pairof
ballisticmissilesfiredfromYemen.Videos
posted on social media captured loud
boomsoverAbuDhabi,thecapital.
The Houthis,anIranianbackedmili
tantgroupthatcontrols partofYemen,
claimed responsibility. Since 2015 they
havebeenfightinga coalitionledbySaudi
Arabia,andincludingtheuae, whichin
vadedYementodeposethem.Aweekbe
fore the missile attack, the Houthis
launchedadroneattack onAbuDhabi’s
airportandanindustrialarea.Threework
ersfromIndiaandPakistanwerekilled.
Thatattacktriggereda ferociouswave
ofSaudiandEmiratiairstrikesinYemen,
manyofwhichkilledcivilians.Thedeadli
est,onJanuary21st,hita prisoninSaada,a
northerncity.MédecinsSansFrontières,a
medicalcharitywithemployeesthere,said
atleast 82 peoplewerekilled(pictured).A
separatestrikeona telecomsfacilityinHo
deidadisconnectedYemenfromtheinter
netforfourdays.
Houthiattackshavebecomecommon
inSaudiArabia,whichshootsdownmis
silesordronesalmosteveryweek.Thiswas
thefirsttimetheHouthishadsuccessfully
targetedtheuae. Itreflectstheirfuryatan
abruptbattlefieldreversalinYemen,engi
neeredbytheEmiratis.Anditpresentsthe
uaewitha difficultchoice:tobackoff,al
lowingtheHouthistocaptureanimpor
tantcity,ortoriskmoreattacksthatcould
inflictrealdamageonitseconomy.
Formorethana yearthemainfrontline
inYemenhasbeenaroundthecityofMa
rib,120km(75miles)eastofSana’a,thecap
ital.Itishometo3mpeople,onethirdof
themdisplacedfromotherregions,andto
Yemen’slargestoilandgasreserves.The
Houthishavethrownwavesoffightersat
the city, including children. Casualties
havebeenhorrific,buttheyhaveslowly
worndownthecity’sdefenders.
Theuaehadlittletodowiththis.In
2019 itwithdrewmostofitstroopsfroma
warithadcometoseeasa quagmire.Emi
ratishadfoughtlargelyinsouthYemen,
whichwasanindependentcountryuntil
1990 andretainsa secessioniststreak.The
Houthis havelittle supportthere. Fora
timeitseemedtheEmiratiswerepursuing
defactopartition:theywouldmaintain  a
sphereofinfluenceinthesouth,while the
Saudibacked and internationally recog
nised government struggled against  the
Houthisinthenorth.
Lastyear,however,theHouthisinvaded
Shabwa, an energyrich southern prov
ince.WithMaribteeteringandthesouth
underthreat,thecoalitionchangedtactics.
OnDecember25thSaudiArabiaagreed  to
sackthegovernorofShabwa,a controver
sialfigureaffiliatedwithIslah,anIslamist
partydislikedbytheEmiratis.Hisreplace
ment,atribalfigure,hasgoodrelations
withtheuae(wherehelivedforyears).
TheGiantsBrigades,a militiabacked by
theuae, thenmovedthousandsofitsfight
ersfromtheRedSeacoasttoShabwa. Their
gainswereswift:theypushedtheHouthis
outofShabwaandwentontoseizebits of
Maribprovinceaswell.Battlefieldvicto
riesinYemenarenotalwaysdurable. Still,
theHouthishavesuffereda bigsetback in
thepastfewweeks.Insteadofa seemingly
inexorablemarchtoseizeMarib,they now
facea newthreatontheirsouthernflank.
TheattacksonAbuDhabiwerean ulti
matumtotheuae: haltyouradvance  or
facefurtherbombardment. Thephysical
danger is modest. Houthi missiles  and
dronescannotcarrybigpayloads,and the
uaehasadvancedairdefences—bolstered
byAmerica,whichhasthousandsoftroops
atalDhafra,anairbasesouthofAbuDhabi
(theyfiredtheirownairdefencesystems
attheHouthimissilesonJanuary24th).The reputational risk is far greater. The
uaemarkets  itself  as  an  oasis  of  stability,
seemingly  immune  to  the  region’s  con
flicts, even as it has pursued an aggressive
foreign  policy  that  embroiled  it  in  them.
Investors  view  it  as  a  safe  place  to  start  a
business or buy property. The 22m tourists
who  visited  in  2019  had  little  to  worry
about beyond sunburn or some bad oysters
at  brunch.  Continued  attacks  would  jeop
ardise that image.
They  could  also  complicate  the  uae’s
recent efforts at rapprochement with Iran.
Tahnoun  bin  Zayed,  the  national  security
adviser, visited Tehran in December. Ebra
him Raisi, Iran’s president, has been invit
ed  to  visit  Abu  Dhabi.  The  uae hoped
friendlier  ties  would  allow  it  to  avoid  ex
actly these sorts of attacks. The Houthis are
not  fully  an  Iranian  proxy—they  often  act
independently. But the attacks on the uae
were  made  possible  by  Iranian  support.
The drones and missiles aimed at Abu Dha
bi were probably based on Iranian designs.
Now  the  uaemust  decide  whether  to
press  forward  or  pull  back  in  Yemen.  It
could reach a deal with the Houthis to keep
the Giants Brigades in Shabwa as a defen
sive force. If Marib falls, however, Shabwa
would  become  more  vulnerable.  The
Houthis  could  also  force  the  uae’s  hand.
They have threatened strikes on Dubai, the
uae’s business and tourism hub; on Janu
ary 25th a spokesman for the group warned
visitors to avoid Expo 2020, the world’s fair
that opened in October.
Such attacks would be a serious escala
tion,  which  would  probably  draw  the  uae
deeper  into  the  war—and  perhaps  also
America, which last year ended support for
“offensive operations” by the coalition. All
of this, then, could backfire on the Houth
is.  They  benefited  from  the  withdrawal  of
the uae, with the coalition’s most capable
army.  Trying  to  keep  the  Emiratis  out,the
Houthis could instead pull them back in.nD UBAI
Strikes on the United Arab Emirates may backfire on the Houthi rebelsNo end to the suffering in Yemen 