320 sLAde goRton: A hALf centuRy in poLitics
Now it fell to the United States Senate to conduct a trial to determine if
the president should be removed from office. With sadness and anxiety,
Lott watched the impeachment process unfold on TV from his 1854 home
overlooking the Gulf of Mexico. He remembers thinking a bomb was be-
ing pitched onto his lap. Lott believed Clinton was guilty as charged and
ought to do the honorable thing, like Nixon, and resign. As majority
leader, however, it was up to him to prove the system still worked. He and
Gorton knew one thing for certain: Absent some devastating new evi-
dence, there was no way, no how, the Republicans could muster a two-
thirds majority, 67 votes, to convict Clinton.^5
Gorton called from Seattle. Early on he’d told Lott impeachment was
barreling their way “like a freight train,” and most of the senators were
in serious denial. Equally worrisome, few of their fellow Republicans
seemed to grasp the realpolitik: how they handled impeachment could
spell success or failure at the polls in 2000.^6
Gorton reported that his friend Joe Lieberman had suggested they
team up on a plan to ensure the trial would be dignified, bipartisan and
as a brief as possible. Have at it, said Lott.
En route to Hawaii for a holiday with his family, Gorton phoned Lie-
berman. Between the middle of the Pacific and a car heading down a
rural road in Connecticut, the two senators began to craft what became
the Lieberman-Gorton Plan. It called for a “rapid and reasonable” trial
based on the House proceedings. That meant they could avoid calling
witnesses. The Starr Report was “almost pornographic,” Gorton said, and
they wanted none of that. Congress had a full plate and shouldn’t waste
its time on a pointless, divisive, long-drawn-out trial.^7
On opening day, the two former attorneys general proposed, the House
prosecutors would present their evidence. Day two would feature rebut-
tals from the Clinton defense team. The third day would be devoted to
questioning of both sides. On the fourth and fifth days, the Senate would
debate Clinton’s guilt, then take what amounted to a test vote. If the votes
were there to convict the president on either charge—a highly unlikely
event—only then would a full-blown trial ensue, with House prosecutors
allowed to call witnesses. If two-thirds majorities were lacking, as surely
would be the case, the Senate would have the option of ending the trial
and considering censure as an alternative to impeachment. Censure would
require only a simple majority.^8
Lott liked it. So did Tom Daschle, the minority leader. Lott was wor-
ried, though, about blowback from his right flank. When the press got
wind of the idea and erroneously labeled it the “Lott-Lieberman Proposal,”