not so supeR 371
to keep the team or land a replacement. Gorton criticized the governor and
legislative leaders for “a failure of both imagination and courage.”^3
The board voted 28-2 to send the Sonics to Oklahoma City. NBA Com-
missioner David Stern, livid that the city persisted in taking its case to
trial, accused Gorton of waging a “scorched-earth” campaign. If Gorton
and the mayor persisted in attempting “to exact whatever pound of flesh
is possible here,” Stern warned, they might jeopardize Seattle’s chances
of landing a replacement team anytime soon.^4
Gorton replied evenly that the city would be pleased to negotiate an exit
settlement with Bennett if Seattle was guaranteed a replacement team.
“My goal from the very beginning has been to have a team,” Gorton said.
“Revenge, I’m not interested in, as such. The city has a financial stake in
all this. The mayor and I are in complete accord that what we want is a
team. Whatever David Stern said about me, my principle unhappiness...
is not directed at David Stern. At this point, we have not given him a plan
with an arena adequate for the NBA in the 21st century. If we do and he
doesn’t respond, my attitude will be different. But at this point, we haven’t
given him that chance.”^5
whenhe t cAse went to tRiAL in U.S. District Court in Seattle, dueling
tales of duplicity unfolded. Unsealed e-mails, memos and PowerPoints
yielded juicy quotes. Sonics attorney Brad Keller, for starters, charged
that the city had “unclean hands.” Gorton, McGavick, Ballmer and for-
mer Sonics CEO Wally Walker were part of a strategy to bleed Bennett’s
group into submission, Keller said. Walker, like Gorton, was a contracted
consultant to the city when the group met at his home in the fall of 2007.
They reviewed a presentation developed by McGavick. “The Sonics Chal-
lenge: Why a Poisoned Well Affords a Unique Opportunity” was duly en-
tered into evidence. The section labeled “making them sell” described a
“pincer movement” to boost the Oklahomans’ costs “in an unpleasant
environment while increasing the league’s belief that an alternative solu-
tion gains it a good new owner and keeps it in a desirable market.” The
role of Gorton and the others would be to “increase pain” of trying to leave.^6
Paul Lawrence, one of Gorton’s K&L Gates colleagues, told the court
the pain was self-inflicted. Bennett and the other Oklahoma investors
were “all sophisticated businessmen who know what it means to sign and
assume a contract.” That the Sonics had been losing money at KeyArena
they knew full well. They assumed that risk when they bought the fran-
chise and assumed its obligations. The city was merely holding the team
to a valid lease.^7