caused in a time when the native religion was strong” (1931, 54). Accord-
ing to Dodds, such cults were “expressions of helpless dependence; he who
treats another human being as divine thereby assigns to himself the rela-
tive status of a child or an animal” (1959, 242).
Through such cults, rulers became a somewhat superficial replacement
for the “old gods,” whose importance was waning. Nilsson’s strictly nega-
tive evaluation of ruler cults, within his overall story of a “dying religion”
(which is paralleled in the works of other scholars, e.g., P. Green 1990,
396–413), evinces the convergence of the two modernizing concerns—the
one regarding superior political life (i.e., the idealized picture of classical
Athens) and the other regarding genuine religion (i.e., the idealized picture
of Christianity)—which together serve as the basis for evaluating whether
something is degeneration, rather than simply change or development. On
the one hand, ruler cults involved the inhabitants of the polisin the worship
of the same outside, interfering power that was already undermining their
freedom and democracy. On the other hand, they also embodied a strictly
outward, state-supported, and artificial form of religion, far removed from
the personal religion that otherwise might have evoked the genuine feeling
of individual participation. Nilsson and other scholars have similar things
to say regarding imperial cults in the Roman era, which ostensibly had very
little meaning for those who were involved and “lacked all genuine religious
content” (Nilsson 1948, 178; cf. 1961, 385; for discussion and criticism of such
oversimplifications, see Pleket 1965; Price 1984; Harland 1996, 2000). Once
again, value judgments, informed by modern concerns rather than the
weight of the evidence, play a significant role in the development of this
overall scenario of a tragic decline, with a touch of romance being added to
the plot through reference to the forthcoming triumph of Christianity. In
chapter 1 of this book, Vaage gives examples of how similar assumptions by
historians have shaped perceptions of early Christianity and its competitors.
According to the common view, one of the most important responses
to feelings of deracination was the rise of what scholars such as Nilsson and
Festugière call private or personal religion. This was, supposedly, a replace-
ment for the outward and in many ways artificial public or civic religion,
which no longer evoked the feeling of the individuals who participated.
As traditional civic religious structures declined, private clubs, mysteries,
and associations (which often involved not only the individual’s personal
choice, but also some notion of salvation) were the most successful social-
religious units (Festugière 1954, 40; Dodds 1959, 243). This was because they
responded to feelings of helplessness, isolation, and uncertainty by pro-
viding a replacement for the sense of belonging and attachment that indi-
The Declining Polis? 31