which relied upon social network connections and was accompanied by a
particular cultural world view.
By the time the regions of western Asia Minor were incorporated into
the Roman province of Asia (ca. 133 BCE), this system of benefaction—an
elaboration and systematization of conventions that characterized the
Greekpolisin earlier times—had become a prominent structural element
with special relevance to the social system and economic well-being of the
cities. Space does not permit a discussion of the origins of this system of
benefaction or euergetism (see Veyne 1990; 1987, 95–115; Gauthier 1985;
1993; cf. Wallace-Hadrill 1990, 150–54; Mitchell 1993, 1:210; Sartre 1991,
147–66). Basically, Veyne differs from Gauthier in emphasizing a sharp
caesura between the classical/democratic and the Hellenistic/non-democratic
period, in connection with the emergence of euergetism as a system in
Hellenistic times. Gauthier, on the other hand (correctly, I believe), puts
emphasis on the continuing importance of democracy, and suggests that
euergetism flows naturally from the competitive ethos of democracy; he sees
the era of full-fledged euergetism from the second century BCEonward.
Wallace-Hadrill discusses ways in which “the Romans absorbed the Greek
honorific idiom gradually, almost without realising it” (1990, 166).
This system involved webs of reciprocal relations within social net-
works marked by a clearly differentiated hierarchy, though the potential for
relations was quite fluid at all levels. The most prominent characteristic of
these reciprocal relations within social networks was the exchange of ben-
efits or gifts of numerous kinds (e.g., protection, financial contributions for
various purposes) in return for appropriate honours. The system was recip-
rocal, in the sense that both the benefactor and the beneficiary (whether
gods, individuals, groups, or institutions) stood to gain from the exchange,
whether the benefit was tangible or otherwise. The system was also self-
perpetuating, in that a benefaction was followed by fitting honours, which
in turn ensured the probability of further benefactions from the same
source in the future, as well as benefactions from others who might seek
to outdo their competitors in the pursuit of honour.
The appropriateness of the honours depended on both the nature of the
benefits conferred and the position of the benefactor and the beneficiary
within the overall hierarchy of relations. Failure fittingly to honour a bene-
factor resulted in shame (aischynê); as Dio of Prusa suggests, this was akin
to impiety (asebeia) toward the gods (Or. 31.57, 65, 80–81, 157). Correspond-
ingly, failure of the wealthy to provide such benefactions appropriately was
a threat to the position they strove to maintain within society: in this sense,
benefaction became an obligation, not simply a voluntary action. The pro-
nora
(Nora)
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