The second limitation of such cognitivism, related to the first one, is its
exclusive focus on the constraints of what is called cognitive architecture on
performance, independent of various supporting (and sometimes enabling)
or debilitating emotions and motivations in functional contexts. To be sure,
findings of cognitive psychology about attentional bottleneck (Simon,
1994), working memory capacity (G. Miller, 1956), or schemata (Rumel-
hart, 1980) are some of the most important scientific breakthroughs in the
history of psychology. Indeed these findings have profound implications for
intellectual functioning (e.g., progressive deepening: Newell, 1990), emo-
tion (the violation of schematic anticipation and surprise: Kagan, 2002),
and task motivation (e.g., the regulatory control of attention: Simon, 1967,
1994). However, Broadbent had every reason to be unhappy that his inno-
vative ideas regarding short-term memory got picked up quickly but his
main message of how stress might influence cognitive performance was ig-
nored (Broadbent, 1958, 1971). In real life, levels of intellectual functioning
are typically not an invariant property of a cognitive system, but depend on
one’s motivational and emotional states. This is why while G. Miller (1956)
was figuring out the magic number 7 plus/minus 2 (short-term memory ca-
pacity), Bruner (Bruner, Matter, & Papanek, 1955; see Bruner, 1992) con-
templated a more functionalist question of whether motivational states
such as hunger might narrow the scope of information search, or even cre-
ate a tunnel vision. Kasparov (2003) felt a great deal of pressure in the face
of the daunting machine, which was poised to beat him and undermine his
premier reputation as the world chess champion. Such a high-stakes func-
tional context is stressful and anxiety-provoking yet energizing for
Kasparov but does not change Deep Junior’s behavior in any conceivable
way. Such a performance condition also tests the human capacity for har-
nessing one’s emotional energy in the service of goal strivings, while con-
trolling distracting, interfering, or otherwise debilitating emotions and feel-
ings, and ego concerns unknown to classical cognitive models of human
problem solving (e.g., Newell & Simon, 1972).
The third limitation of cognitivism is its inability to include human
phenomenological (i.e., subjective) experiences as a legitimate (and often es-
sential) force for higher-order mental functions. Labouvie-Vief (1990) quite
cogently characterized this omission as thinking without the thinker. What is
missing in a typical cognitivist approach is the role of consciousness, inten-
tionality, and reflectivity. Snow (1986) described these properties of the mind
as part and parcel of human intelligence:
Persons (including psychologists) not only feel, strive, and know, but alsoknow
that they feel, strive, and know, and can anticipate further feeling, striving, and
knowing; they monitor and reflect upon their own experience, knowledge, and
mental functioning in past, present, and future tenses. (pp. 133–134)6 DAI AND STERNBERG