this praxis could be taxing, it is fitting that left PFC be prewired to regu-
late–potentiate the positive affects–emotions, so that left PFC can boost
them and consequently gain positive expectations and persistency for coping
with the tasks at hand. This is of course a winner’s formula that evolution
might have given us and experience might refine (Kagan, 2001, 2002). Like-
wise, when the organism is taken by positive emotions and facilitating situa-
tions, it is fitting that right PFC be called on first, so that the first view and ex-
ploration of the situation and circumstances (Kagan, 2002; Pascual-Leone,
1990; Pascual-Leone & Irwin, 1998) be as open and broad as possible (before
the left PFC intervenes, activated by the right PFC priming of negative af-
fects elicited by surprising–displeasing aspects of this unrestrained explor-
atory approach). This is why Fredrickson (2001) aptly calls her theory of pos-
itive emotions the Broaden-and-Build Theory.
We can sketch a better picture of the motivational controls if we add to
this regulation model a concept of where theself-schemes(i.e., the child’s self-
referential representations) might be centered in the brain (see Fig. 8.3). We
share the views of those who believe that self-schemes exist both in LH and in
RH (Eccles, 1980; Gazzaniga, 1995; Levy, 1990; Sperry, 1990). We have dis-
cussed above and elsewhere (Pascual-Leone, 2000b) the two different organi-
zations of self-schemes. Namely:Self1(which appears earlier but consoli-
dates at about 18 months of age, when the child becomes aware of both
object and self as subject of experience, but is not symbolically self-con-
scious); andself 2(which begins in the second year but consolidates at about 3
years of age, when children, in a self-conscious and symbolic manner, begin
to have explicit views about self and others and so can for the first time draw
a man or woman). Self1 is purely experiential, and we speculate that it might
be the sort of self-consciousness that is created predominately by RH proc-
esses. Self2 is symbolic and explicitly (i.e., self-consciously) interpersonal and
dialogical. We speculate that self2 is situated predominantly in LH. It is
tempting to think that self1 and self2 are connected closely both with the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the anterior temporal lobe. The ventro-
medial cortex (Bechara et al., 1999; Davidson, 2001; Kelley et al., 2002) might
be a site for the operative (or acting) self, that is, theIorI-selfof the person
(Pascual-Leone, 1990, 2000b; Pascual-Leone & Irwin, 1998). The anterior
part of the temporal lobes may be related to the figurative (or representa-
tional) self, better known as themeorme-self. In this manner, the self would
be in contact with the operative (agency) side of mental attention, and (via
the anterior temporal pole, BA38) it would also be in contact with the limbic
system.
We speculate that the LH limbic system is more closely connected with
positive–approach affects, whereas the RH limbic lobe is more related to neg-
ative–withdrawal affects. This idea seems consistent with Davidson’s theory
of affective styles (Davidson, 2001). This affective-style limbic assumption
- AFFECT, SELF-MOTIVATION, AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 227