entiation and amplification can be the result of emotions that are more nega-
tive, as well as more violent—emotions such as anger and rage, or fear and
terror that drive the individual toward differentiation in the pursuit of more
defensive goals of self-preservation. What is the difference in the processes of
differentiation that are more truly growth-oriented and ones that are aimed
at more defensive goals (see Baumeister, 1989; Fredrickson, 2001; Magai &
Haviland-Jones, 2002; Pyszczynski et al., 2000; White, 1969)?
Turning back to the analysis of the limitations of the cognitivist bias in
Piaget’s theory, an important one is the fact that although in some contexts
Piaget (1980) discussed how cognitive development alters the very nature of
emotions, yet in others he devaluated the sensorimotor and figurative aspects
that are part and parcel of emotional experience. Thus his model retained
many hierarchical features according to which emotions are subordinated to
cognitions. A result is that whole domains of important emotional develop-
ment are not considered; rather, they tend to be discounted as less developed,
more primitive ways of relating to reality. This is especially true of the nature
of symbolism that plays such a pervasive role in art, literature, myth, and re-
ligion. A result of this discounting is that the theory does not permit us to dif-
ferentiate between relatively evolved and mature forms of these activities as
compared to relatively primitive and even pathological ones. Yet many recent
developments suggest that emotion-related domains themselves develop even
if they do not become representational in the same way that relatively formal
cognitions do (Labouvie-Vief, 1994; Schore, 1994). All of these factors re-
quire a model of cognitive-affective integration that is more explicit in high-
lighting dynamic features of cognition–affect relations.
GROWTH AS DYNAMIC INTEGRATION
OF OPTIMIZATION AND DIFFERENTIATION
In the previous section we suggested that the evolving cognitive system alters
the dynamics of emotional functioning, widening and broadening it, but also
altering it qualitatively. Of core importance in that process is the interplay be-
tween two core strategies, one aimed at deviation dampening, maintaining
equilibrium, and stability, the other at deviation amplification, disequilib-
rium, and change—two core processes we have referred to as optimization
and differentiation. In the current section, we draw on recent theories of self-
regulation and affect regulation to spell out how cognitive-affective schemas
coordinate the demands of strong affective activation on one hand with those
of careful, ego-oriented, and objective cognitive analysis. When are they able
to secure well-integrated functioning of the two systems and when, in con-
trast, do they fail to achieve an effective integration? In the current section,
we first discuss the general mechanism underlying this dynamic process of in-
244 LABOUVIE-VIEF AND GONZÁLEZ