The emergence of language is accompanied by yet more complex cogni-
tive-affective systems. Harris (2000) noted that already at the age of 2, emo-
tion utterances are not related to the immediate situation only, but about half
of them are concerned with past, future, and recurrent feelings. This emer-
gence of more complex cognitive-affective structures extending through time
and space is supported by the development of several specific but interrelated
competencies. One of those is the development of the self as a reflective
agent—that is, somebody who has inner resources such as intentions, desires,
and thoughts—in other words, an agent who possesses a mind that affords
regulatory capacities. Second order feelings emerge that reflect the progres-
sive emergence of a theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985;
Dennett, 1987; Leslie, 1987; Premack & Woodruff, 1978), which enables the
child to understand others’ minds in terms of concepts of intentional states
such as beliefs and desires, and thus, to understand others as separate beings
that can evaluate the self—self-conscious forms of regulation. Lewis (2000)
suggested that in the second half of the second year of life the cognitive ca-
pacity of objective self-awareness emerges, with emotions such as embarrass-
ment, empathy, and envy. Between 2 and 3 years of age, a somewhat more
complex ability emerges—that of evaluating one’s behavior according to a
standard (external or internal). This marks the beginning of self-conscious
evaluative emotions such as pride, shame, or guilt.
Lewis (2000) noted that the emergence of self-conscious evaluative emo-
tions marks the beginning of new emotions that are different from so-called
primary emotions, such as happiness or sadness. For example, if we fail at
something, we might feel sad, but if we thought it was our fault, we might
feel shame or guilt—emotions that already require a higher degree of reflec-
tive awareness and control. This capacity for reflective awareness and self-
control becomes further differentiated and reintegrated as throughout
childhood and into adolescence, individuals elaborate an inner world of
mental and subjective processes such as thinking, wishing, goal-setting, and
decision making.
A second dimension, self–other differentiation, is interwoven with the re-
flective one. This dimension indicates an increasing ability to experience oth-
ers as individuals distinct from the self (see Kegan, 1982; Kohlberg, 1969;
Selman, 1980). Yet this distinctness must be coordinated with the experience
of intersubjective bonds that provide an important basis of security, meaning
and self-validation. The experience of such intersubjective support hinges on
the understanding of a reciprocity of intentions, thoughts, and values that is
able to incorporate increasing diversity and differences. At first, the child is
able to understand that others’ feelings and judgments imply an evaluation of
one’s self, an understanding that matures into the realization that self and
others share a world of emotions and inner perspectives that can differ yet
250 LABOUVIE-VIEF AND GONZÁLEZ