center of gravity in their model is M-capacity, the developing mental capac-
ity. What is the most striking is their painstaking efforts to delineate specific
forms or structures of various mental functions of the cognitive, motiva-
tional, and affective nature. Such a task is often neglected by psychologists
(Kagan, 2002) and can be most appropriately addressed from a developmen-
tal point of view.
Bruner (1983) pointed out, based on the infant research, that various
forms of human agency, in terms of symbolic capability, means–ends sensi-
tivity, self-awareness, and concern with evaluative standards, all appear at
the end of the second year of life. Similarly, Labouvie-Vief and Gonzalez
(chap. 9) discuss the emergence of extended consciousness and the reflective
self during the same period of development. Different from an exclusive focus
on representative intelligence as Piaget did, these authors attempt to extend
the Piagetian tradition. They explicate how affective experiences and motiva-
tion shape the way individuals interact with the environment, and how the
process is constrained by both organismic and contextual factors, including
aging (see also Zimmerman & Schunk, chap. 12, for a social-cognitive view of
the development of the self-regulatory agency).
Maintaining Self Versus Expanding Self
Labouvie-Vief and Gonzalez (chap. 9) elaborated on the legacy of the
Piagetian notion that developmental transformation occurs as a result of a
dynamic interplay of relatively reactive equilibrium-maintaining (assimila-
tion) and relatively proactive, disequilibrating (accommodation) strategies.
What is novel in their argument is that in order for new cognitive structures
or competencies to take hold, they need to be validated by feeling and ren-
dered meaningful and integrated at a personal level (or appropriated; see
Ferrari & Elik, 2003, on conceptual change). However, in the process of cog-
nitive-affective integration, one can overaccommodate, resulting in cognitive
or knowledge structures purely derived from others and not firmly affirmed
by affective experiences; one can also overassimilate in an attempt to main-
tain positive affect, resulting in cognitive rigidity and the failure of differenti-
ation, hampering chances for intellectual growth. Such formulation breaks
loose of the normative doctrine of intellectual development, and thus is
poised to explain the phenomenon of developmental variability and diver-
gence not adequately addressed by Piaget (Bidell & Fischer, 1992).
As Bidell and Fischer (1992) pointed out, Piaget never resolved the tension
between two main tenets of his theory: his constructivist view of knowledge
as the product of self-regulated functional activity in specific contexts, and
his abstract structuralist stage theory. It is not coincidental that Pascual-
20 DAI AND STERNBERG