the same time. The first of these is a necessary state of affairs; it cannot fail to be actual.
The second is a contingent state of affairs; it is such that although it is actual, it might not
have been actual at all. (Al Gore's being the 54th President of the United States is also a
contingent state of affairs. It is such that although it is not actual, it could have been
actual.) And our third example is an impossible state of affairs. It is such that it simply
cannot be actual. Of it we might say: “Even God could not bring about Smith's being
exactly 20 years old and 35 years old at the same time.” For no matter how powerful a
being is, no being can bring it about that an impossible state of affairs (a state of affairs
that simply cannot be actual) is, nevertheless, an actual state of affairs. Having
distinguished these three sorts of states of affairs, we can now see that it would be a
mistake to think that for God to be omnipotent he must be able to actualize any state of
affairs whatever. For, as Aquinas clearly saw, power extends only to what is possible.
Whatever is impossible does not come within the scope of power because it cannot have
the aspect of possibility. Thus, Aquinas says, “It is more appropriate to say that such
things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them” (1945, Summa Theologica, I, 25,
art. 3). And surely he is right about this. The fact that no one, including God, can
actualize an impossible state of affairs does not detract from the power of anyone,
including God.
Thus far, it looks as though we might characterize God's being omnipotent
end p.
as God's having the power to actualize any state of affairs that isn't impossible. But
consider some necessary state of affairs such as 2 + 2's being 4. Necessary states of
affairs aren't impossible. Indeed, they are actual no matter what any agent does or does
not bring about. So, it makes no sense to think that some being can “bring it about” that a
necessary state of affairs is actual. For it is possible to bring it about that a state of affairs
is actual only if that state of affairs can fail to be actual. And, as we've seen, a necessary
state of affairs cannot fail to be actual. Perhaps, then, we should characterize God's being
omnipotent as God's having the power to actualize any state of affairs that is
contingent—neither impossible nor necessary. But consider George W. Bush's not being
the 54th President of the United States. This is a contingent state of affairs. For although
Bush is the 54th President, it logically could have been otherwise. But is it now in God's
power to bring it about that George W. Bush is not the 54th President of the United
States? Well, if it is now in God's power to bring it about that George W. Bush is not the
54th President of the United States, then it is in God's power so to act that some fact
wholly about the past would not have been a fact at all. And while it is true that at some
time in the past God could have prevented Bush's victory, few would think that it is now,
after the fact, in his power to do so. As Aristotle observed, “No one deliberates about the
past but only about what is future and capable of being otherwise, while what is past is
not capable of not having taken place; hence Agathon is right in saying: `For this alone is
lacking, even in God, to make undone things that have once been done' ” (1941,
Nicomachean Ethics, VII, 2. 1139).
In light of these considerations, perhaps we should say that for God to be omnipotent is
for God to have the power to bring about any state of affairs that is contingent and not
inconsistent with some fact wholly about the past. But while this seems right as far as it