metaphor, analogy, and symbols. This is not a peculiar mark of mysticism, however,
since quite common in science, philosophy, and religion.
Philosophers who have stressed ineffability as a mark of the mystical may be attempting
to mark mysticism as “irrational,” thus excluding it from more sensible human pursuits.
Grace Jantzen has advanced a critique of the emphasis on ineffability as an attempt to
remove mystical experiences from the realm of rational discourse, placing them instead
into the realm of the emotions (1995, 344). Others have staunchly defended the
“rationality” of mysticism against charges of irrationalism (Staal 1975).
4.2 Paradoxicality
Scholars of mysticism sometimes stress the “paradoxical” nature of mystical experiences.
As with ineffability, it is not always clear whether the experience, the mystical object, or
both are supposed to be paradoxical. We can discern four relevant senses of
“paradoxical.” (1) According to its etymology, “paradoxical” refers to what is surprising
or “contrary to expectation.” (2) Language can be intentionally “paradoxical” in using a
logically improper form of words to convey what is not intended to be logically absurd.
This may be for rhetorical effect or because of difficulty in conveying a thought without
resort to linguistic tricks. (3) As in philosophy, a “paradox” can involve an unexpected
logical contradiction, as in the “Liar Paradox.” (4) Walter Stace sees paradoxality as a
universal feature of mystical experiences, equating “paradoxality” with an intended
logical contradiction (1961, 212; see section 5 on Stace).
Insofar as mystical experience is out of the ordinary, and the unitive quality strange (for
ordinary folk, at least), reports of them may very well be surprising or contrary to
expectation. Hence, they may be paradoxical in sense (1). Reports of mystical
experiences may be paradoxical also in sense (2), because at times mystical language
does assume logically offensive forms, when actual absurdity may not be intended.
However, paradox in this sense occurs less frequently in firsthand reports of mystical
experiences and more in second-order mystical systems of thought (Moore 1973; Staal
1975).
end p.144
There is no good reason, however, why mystical experiences or their objects should be
paradoxical in either senses (3) or (4). In general, there is no good reason for thinking that
reports of mystical experience should imply logical absurdity. The attempt to designate
mystical experiences as paradoxical in these senses may be but another try at painting
mysticism into an irrational corner. We may be too eager to take logically deviant
language at its most literal. For example, Zen Buddhism speaks of reaching a state of
mind beyond both thought and “no-thought.” However, rather than referring to a middle
state, neither thought nor no-thought, often the intention is to point to a state of mind in
which striving is absent and labeling of mental activities ceases. The mind of “no effort”
strives neither for thought nor for no-thought. No logical absurdity infects this
description. Frits Staal (1975) has argued that paradoxical mystical language has been