meant only to enable the mystic to contemplate the unified supernal structure of the
divine sefirot. And the Zen master Dogen wrote about “wrongly thinking that the nature
of things will appear when the whole world we perceive is obliterated” (1986, 39). (3)
Accordingly, reports of emptying out and forgetting may refer only to an emptying of
ordinary experiential content, making room for an extraordinary content. This accords
well with the conception of ayin (nothingness) in Jewish mysticism, which is positively
saturated with divine reality (Matt 1997). Some have claimed that even for Meister
Eckhart emptying out is having one's mind on no object other than God, rather than an
absolute emptiness of content (Matt 1997). (4) Perennialists may be exaggerating the
wakefulness of some emptying out. The Islamic Sufi fana experience (“passing away”) is
sometimes described as an unconscious state, and the Sufi might become purely
unconscious on finding God in wajd (Schimmel 1975, 178–79). Therefore, an emptying
out might sometimes simply be pure unconsciousness. (5) Even if a subject honestly
reports on a PCE, there may have been conceptual events the subject either repressed or
experienced in a nebulous way (Wainwright 1981, 117–19).
end p.147
7. Constructivism
Constructivism underscores the conceptual “construction” of mystical experience. Let us
call “weak constructivism” the view that there is no mystical experience without
concepts, concepts being what “construct” an experience. Let us call “hard
constructivism” the view that a mystic's specific cultural background massively
constructs—determines, shapes, or influences—the nature of mystical experiences (see
Hollenback 1996; Jones 1909, introduction; Katz 1978). Hard constructivism entails the
denial of perennialism on the assumption that mystical traditions are widely divergent
(see section 7.3). Weak constructivism is strictly consistent with perennialism, however,
since consistent with there being some transcultural mystical experience involving
concepts. Both strong and weak constructivist arguments have been mobilized against the
existence of PCEs.
7.1 Weak Constructivist Arguments against PCE Defenders
Here is a sampling of weak constructivist arguments against PCE defenders. (1) PCEs are
impossible because of the “kind of beings” that we are (Katz 1978, 59). It is a fact about
humans that we can experience only with the aid of memory, language, expectations, and
conceptualizations. Therefore, we cannot have a “pure” awareness, empty of all content.
(2) PCEs cannot be “experiences” (Proudfoot 1985, ch. 4; Bagger 1999, ch. 4). We must
distinguish, the claim goes, between an “event” and an “experience.” That X “has an
experience” E entails that X conceptualizes E. Hence, even if pure conscious events
happen to occur, they do not count as “experiences” until the subject conceptualizes
them. At that moment, they cease to be “pure consciousness.” (3) A survey of mystical