No matter how unlikely it is that God exists, as long as there is some positive nonzero
probability that he does, believing is one's best bet:
- For any person S, and alternatives, α and β, available to S, if the expected utility of α
exceeds that of β, S should choose α. And, - Believing in God carries more expected utility than does not believing, given that the
existence of God has a positive, nonzero probability. Therefore,
C. One should believe in God.
Because of its ingenious employment of infinite utility, the third version has become
what most philosophers think of as Pascal's wager. We will refer to it as the canonical
version.
The fourth version of the wager is found in the concluding remarks that Pascal makes to
his interlocutor in Pensées 680:
But what harm will come to you from taking this course? You will be faithful, honest,
humble, grateful, doing good, a sincere and true friend. It is, of course, true; you will not
take part in corrupt pleasure, in glory, in the pleasures of high living. But will you not
have others?
I tell you that you will win thereby in this life. (1995, 156)
The fourth version brings us full circle, away from arguments under risk and back to an
argument under uncertainty. This version remedies the defect that precluded the first
argument from strict dominance.
end p.176