Like its predecessors, the fourth version implies that the benefits of belief vastly exceed
those of nonbelief if God exists; but, unlike the others, the fourth implies that F2 > F4.
No matter what, belief is one's best bet. Belief strictly dominates nonbelief. Let's call this
version of the wager the “argument from strict dominance”:
- For any person S, if among the alternatives available to S, the outcomes of one
alternative, α, are better than those of the other available alternatives, S should choose α.
And, - Believing in God is better than not believing, whether God exists or not. Therefore,
C. One should believe in God.
Premise (8) is true only if one gains simply by believing. Pascal apparently thought that
this was obvious. Sincere theistic belief results, he thought, in virtuous living, and
virtuous living is more rewarding than vicious living. The response of Pascal's
interlocutor, we might plausibly imagine, would be that Pascal has made an illicit
assumption: Why think that virtuous living requires theism? And even if virtuous living
requires theism, why think that being morally better is tantamount to being better off all
things considered? Now whether virtue is its own reward only in a theistic context or not,
the relevant point is whether theistic belief provides more benefit than not believing, even
if God does not exist. If it does, then this is an important point when considering the
many-gods objection.
end p.177
The Many-Gods Objection
Like the canonical version, the fourth version seems vulnerable to what's known as the
many-gods objection. Notice that in all four arguments the wager consists of a 2 x 2
matrix: there are two acts available to the agent, with only two possible states of the
world. From Pascal's day to this, critics have been quick to point out that Pascal's
partitioning of the possible states of the world overlooks the obvious: What if some deity