other than God exists? Perhaps there's a deity that harbors animus toward theism, such
that he or she rewards nonbelief (Martin 1990, 232–34). In effect, the many-gods
objection asserts that Pascal's 2 x 2 matrix is flawed because the states it employs are not
jointly exhaustive of the possibilities. Let's expand the Pascalian matrix:
With D representing the existence of a nonstandard deity, a “deviant” deity, and N
representing the world with no deity of any sort (call this state “naturalism”), theistic
belief no longer strictly dominates.^8 With infinite utility residing in columns G and D,
and with the values of F3, F4, and F7 presumably the same, even weak dominance seems
lost to theism, since there's no state in which theism is better than its competitors. Just as
the many-gods objection is thought by many to be the bane of the third version, one
might think it is fatal to the fourth version of the wager as well.
Still, all is not lost for the Pascalian as long as there's good reason in support of (8). With
(8) in hand, the Pascalian could salvage from the ruins of the fourth version a wager that
circumvents the many-gods objection. Given that the lower two cells of the D column are
the same as the upper cell of the G column, and that F3 = F4 = F7, the Pascalian can
employ the N column as a principled way
end p.178
to adjudicate between believing theistically or not. That is, whether one believes
theistically, or believes in a deviant deity, or refrains from believing in any deity at all,
one is exposed to the same kind of risk (F3 or F4 or F7). The worst outcomes of theistic
belief, of deviant belief, and of naturalistic belief are on a par. Moreover, whether one
believes theistically, or believes in a deviant deity, or refrains from believing in any deity
at all, one enjoys eligibility for the same kind of reward (∞ = ∞ = ∞). The best outcomes,
that is, of theistic belief, of deviant belief, and of naturalistic belief are on a par. Given
(8), however, we would have good reason to believe that F2 > F5. In addition, we have
no evidence to think there's any deviant analogue of (8). We have no reason, that is, to