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runs as follows. First there is an initial “baptism.” There the practice of using that name
to refer to that entity is established by intending to do so, fixing the nominatum in mind
by virtue of a perceptual presentation of it. People who subsequently use the name (or
other referring expression) to pick out the same entity do so by acquiring the practice
from someone further up the chain of transmission, intending to use it to refer to the same
entity as one's donor does. Thus it is that one can succeed in referring to a particular
Greek philosopher with “Aristotle” without having in mind any description that uniquely
picks out that philosopher. Though this mode of reference is commonly termed a causal
theory, on the grounds that the speaker achieves unique reference to O by way of a (direct
or indirect) causal relation to O, I refer to it here as a direct theory of reference.
Before continuing with a discussion of how all this applies to reference to God, let me set
aside a possible confusion. In considering how reference to God is possible, I do not
intend to be establishing the existence of God. Of course, if God does not exist, I cannot
succeed in referring to him, there being no such him to refer to. But the discussion of
referring to God, as a topic in the religious use of language, is limited to considering how
one could succeed in referring to God if God exists, and if there is more than one way,
what implications the differences between them have for religious thought and discourse.
Of the two modes of reference I have distinguished, it is obvious that the descriptive
approach plays an important part in reference to God. It would be very unusual for one
who takes oneself to be referring to God not to have any idea of what God is like. And, as
noted above, purely qualitative uniquely identifying descriptions (if they are exemplified
at all) are much more plentiful for God than for other objects of attempted reference.
And, of course, reference to God could be a purely descriptive affair. If one believes that
there is an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good personal source of being for
everything else that is—however one came by this belief, whether by philosophical
argument, growing up surrounded by people who seemed to take it for granted, being
initiated into the worship of and prayer to such a being, or whatever—then one could take
such descriptions as picking out what one is talking about when uttering sentences with
“God” as subject, even if the reference had no other source.
But it is very common for direct reference to come into the picture as well. One reason
for this is that people normally pick up the linguistic practice of referring to God, as well
as other religious practices, from those who introduce them to these practices. Hence, it is
normal for religious believers to stand at the end of a chain of transmission of a religious
referring practice, a chain of the sort envisaged by Kripke. Typically we learn to refer to
God in praying to God, directing praise, thanksgiving, confession to God, entering into
alleged interaction with God in sacraments and ritual, and so on. We learn to refer to God
as the being with whom we and our guides are in contact in all this. Thus, even if, as is
normally the case, we also learn identifying descriptions of God in the course
end p.229