The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion

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that methodological naturalism, at least in the scientific investigation of that history, is
justified (170–71).
But God cannot be generous to the universe unless God can benefit the universe. Thus,
Van Till's argument presupposes that possessing formational capabilities actually benefits
the universe. The universe, however, is not conscious. Thus (pace deep ecologists), the
claim that it can literally be benefited (or harmed) is highly dubious at best. And even if
nonconscious things can be benefited, the specific claim that possessing fully robust
formational capabilities benefits the universe more than being directly cared for by God
is entirely unsupported. So this attempt to provide a theological reason for denying direct
divine action in the formational history of the universe is at best incomplete.^4


The Nature of Science


Miracles lie outside of science, which by definition deals only with the natural, the
repeatable, that which is governed by law.
—Michael Ruse, 1982


But, of course, methodological naturalism does not restrict our study of nature; it just lays
down which sort of study qualifies as scientific. If someone wants to pursue another
approach to nature—and there are many others—the methodological naturalist has no
reason to object. Scientists have to proceed in this way; the methodology of natural
science gives no purchase on the claim that a particular event or type of event is to be
explained by invoking God's creative action directly.
—Ernan McMullin, 1991


Defining “Science”


According to Michael Ruse (1982, 322), science by definition deals only with the natural,
which implies that no explanation that makes reference to the supernatural is scientific.
But even if Ruse is right about this, it does not follow that methodological naturalism is
true. For the issue here is not a verbal one: the issue is not how the word “science” is
properly used (Plantinga 1997, 146). Rather, the
end p.288


issue is whether or not people who investigate the causes of natural events should look
only for naturalistic causes or also for supernaturalistic ones. Whether one interprets this
issue as the question of whether scientists should broaden their scientific investigations or
as the question of whether scientists should broaden their investigations beyond the
boundaries of science will depend, of course, on the definition of “science.” But the
answer to the question will not depend on that definition. Notice, however, that attempts

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