definition seems to me to be basically correct, in the sense that it captures and expresses
what most Christians seem to have meant when they have talked about miracles. It fits
well with the Christian worldview, the general sort of picture of the world that goes with
the Christian faith.^1
The definition has two parts. The first part is Hume's attempt to put into a more precise
language the idea that the miracle is an event that would not have happened in the
ordinary course of affairs. It happens in the world of nature, but the actions, forces, and
so on, of the world of nature, acting alone, would not have brought it about. The miracle
goes beyond nature in some way. Perhaps it is even something that goes contrary to the
ordinary course of nature. Hume's way of putting that is that the miracle is a transgression
of a law of nature.
The second part of Hume's definition ascribes this transgression to an agent of a certain
sort, “the deity,” or some other “invisible agent.” I suppose that Hume here intends to
import into his definition the idea of God that was common among Christians and with
which he was familiar. And Hume himself uses the term “volition,” which suggests that
the sort of agent he has in mind is an intentional actor, someone who has a will. In
Christianity, God is construed as a person or something like a person. That is, God is
thought of as an agent who has knowledge, will, intention, and desire, as well as a
capacity for action. And God is characteristically thought of as omnipotent, and as the
creator of the world, thus being distinct from the world. So it is natural, within that
context, to suppose that God is capable of acting in the natural world, of producing
effects there. Thus, the second part of Hume's definition fits well with the way Christians
(and other theists) are likely to think of miracles.
Almost all of the subsequent philosophical discussion of miracles has focused on the first
element in Hume's definition, that of the relation of the allegedly miraculous event to the
laws of nature. This is, of course, a crucial element. Antony Flew, a twentieth-century
philosopher who was himself no friend of miracles or of Christianity, has put this point
by saying, “The occurrence of a genuine miracle is, by definition, naturally impossible”
(Habermas and Flew 1987, 6). This is, in fact, a useful way of putting the point, though it
may initially seem paradoxical. Flew goes on to say, in the course of a debate with a
theist about miracles, “The main point I want you to grasp is that all of us here have a
vested interest in the idea of a strong natural order. This ought to be taken as agreed
because it's only if there is that strong natural order that there is anything significant
about the Resurrection” (35).
Two quick points about Flew's observation. First, it is important to take seriously the
occurrence of the words “natural” and “naturally” in Flew's statements. Miracles are
naturally impossible, but it does not follow that they are logically impossible. (It is pretty
clear that Hume did not think that they were logically impossible. Flew does not think so
either.) And from the fact that miracles are naturally impossible it does not follow that
miracles do not occur. What does follow is that genuine miracles do not occur in the
natural course of events in the world. But if there should be a supernatural incursion,
some particular action or volition by God, then the result of that incursion might well be
something that could not have occurred naturally. It would be actual, even though it was
naturally impossible. And that is just the sort of thing that is envisioned in the first part of
Hume's definition of a miracle. The actual occurrence of something that is naturally
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