impossible could well be described as a transgression or violation of the order and course
of nature.
Second, Flew refers to “a strong natural order.” I think that Flew here means to claim that
the natural order must be something more than merely a universal regularity in the
phenomena of the world. The natural order is, of course, related somehow to pervasive
regularities in the world. I will say something more about that relation later. But to make
sense of the Humean idea we must suppose that
end p.306
there is something more to the order of nature than mere regularity, or even universal
regularity. There must be something deeply embedded in the structure of the world that
accounts for the regularity of the phenomena. That deeply embedded element is, I think,
what corresponds to Flew's adjective, “strong.” And that strong element would consist, I
suppose, of a structure of causal relations, and perhaps some other relations, which bind
the phenomena into pervasive patterns of regularity, imposing on the phenomena some
sort of “natural” necessity.
If we accept this definition of a miracle, then we can see that there are at least three ways
in which an alleged miracle might fail to be a genuine miracle. First, the alleged event
may not have happened at all (as it was described). In the case of an alleged resurrection,
for example, the person involved may not really have been dead at all,^2 or the person may
not have really been alive afterward. Second, the alleged event may have happened as
described, but it may not have been a violation of a law of nature. In the case of an
alleged miraculous healing, for example, the disability may have been psychosomatic,
and the subsequent recovery (even if it was rather sudden) may have been well within a
natural course of events. Third, the alleged event may have been real and may have been
a violation of a law of nature, but it may not have been caused by God, and perhaps not
even by some other invisible or supernatural agent.
Critical discussions of miracles have focused almost entirely on the first two of these
ways in which alleged miracles might fail, but there has been little discussion of the third.
That third possibility, however, suggests some interesting questions. One of these is the
question of whether there are, or may be, some other invisible or supernatural intentional
agents in addition to God (as Hume's definition, of course, allows). In some sense,
anyway, this is a question about the possibility of polytheism. Historically, Western
philosophy of religion has dealt extensively with monotheism and atheism, but it has
largely ignored polytheism. Of course, the major religions with which most Western
philosophers have been well acquainted—Christianity, Judaism, and Islam—are officially
monotheistic. They are “one-God” religions. And, I think, there are important senses in
which they really are monotheistic. But many Christians also believe that reality includes
the existence of some other invisible and intentional agents in addition to God. They
believe, that is, in the existence of angels and devils at least. Angels and devils, if they
exist, certainly would seem to fit Hume's reference to “some other invisible agent.” And
on some definitions for the word “god” angels and devils would count as gods (with a
small “g”). If there are such beings, then, there might be a miracle whose agent is a god
but not God, at least not the God acknowledged and worshipped by Christians.^3