If Hume had some experience that directly supported a high probability for (N), then he
would have had an experience that indirectly supported a low probability for (J). But is
there in fact some experience that Hume could have had, or some experience that we
have had, that would be a good basis for assigning a high probability to (N)? It seems to
me that there is no such experience.
Of course, Hume may have had a negative experience about resurrections, an experience
that might be reported in this way:
(E) Hume never observed any resurrection from the dead, he never met anyone who had
been restored to life after dying, etc.
I have no reason to doubt (E), and I have no inclination to doubt it. I think it is very likely
that Hume never came across a genuine resurrection in his whole life. And the same is
true of me. I also have never observed a resurrection. But although (E) is true, and the
corresponding proposition about me is also true, these propositions have no real
relevance with respect to the probability of (N). It is not the negative nature of
propositions such as (E) that makes them irrelevant. It is, rather, the fact that Hume's
sample and my sample are far too small relative to the scope of (N). (N) is a general
proposition whose scope includes millions upon millions of particular cases, all the
human deaths that belong to the history of the world. Hume, we might suppose, had some
direct experience of a few human deaths and of what happened soon thereafter. Perhaps a
dozen or so family members and friends. But even fifty or one hundred would be far too
small to have a significant bearing on the probability of (N).
Of course, Hume's negative experience is just what we should expect if (N) is true. If
there simply are no resurrections, then Hume would not run into one. But Hume's
negative experience is also just what we would expect if there are real resurrections but
they are quite rare. If there are, say, only half a dozen genuine resurrections among the
many millions of deaths there have been in human history, then it is extremely unlikely
that Hume's tiny sample would have caught one of them. So that sample is entirely
unreliable in distinguishing between a world in which there are no resurrections—that is,
the world as described by (N)—and a world in which there are only a few resurrections.
But that distinction is crucial to this case. For there is probably no aficionado of
resurrections, or of miracles in general, who thinks that they are as thick in the world as
fleas on a stray dog.
end p.319
In the light of this observation, one might think of strengthening the case by expanding
the sample. Hume might add to his own experience the experience of his friends, and
beyond that the experience of many other people in the world. And indeed, Hume seems
to take just this tack. He says that a miracle “has never been observed in any age or
country,” and he adds that “there must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every
miraculous event.” And so Hume seems to appeal to something like the following
proposition:
(W) No resurrection has ever been observed by anyone in the whole history of the world.
Now (W), if it were true, would indeed lend some strong support to (N). Perhaps it would
not be entirely conclusive, but one would think that if there were even as many as half a
dozen genuine resurrections in the history of the world, then it is likely that at least one or