Plantinga proposes, for example, that humans have been given a sensus divinitatis, a
God-given disposition to believe in God in certain circumstances (2000, 173). For
example, when contemplating a flower or reflecting on an evil one has done, a person
may be moved to believe “God has made this wondrous thing” or “God disapproves of
this shoddy behavior.” Recently, Plantinga has extended this claim that belief in God can
be properly basic to the claim that the central truths of Christian faith can be held in a
properly basic way, if they are held on the basis of “the instigation of the Holy Spirit”
(2000, 265).
Plantinga does not claim to be able to demonstrate that these beliefs about the sensus
divinitatis and the instigation of the Holy Spirit are true. He argues, rather, that if they are
true, then it is likely that some individuals are reasonable to believe them, and may even
know them. Such a position is unsatisfying to many philosophers, who wish to be able to
determine what is true on the basis
end p.334
of some “neutral” epistemological position that provides a basis for examining all such
truth claims. Plantinga is in effect arguing that such an epistemological stance may be
beyond our human capacities. What we can know depends on the truth about our world
and our capacities, and what we believe we can know may depend on our beliefs about
the world and our capacities. There may be no “neutral” epistemological stance, for what
we think we can know may depend on what we believe about our relation to the world we
are trying to know, and that varies. The evidentialist objection to religious belief, insofar
as it rests on the assumption that religious beliefs must be based on such “neutral
evidence,” may therefore rest on assumptions that are undermined by the limits of human
reason. Though Plantinga himself rejects the label of fideism, his work may be seen as
illustrating the view that reason has limits that it is rational to recognize.
One of the claims associated with fideism is what we might call the “no-neutrality”
thesis, the claim that the amount of “common ground” available to human knowers is
much smaller than many have assumed, especially with respect to religious claims. Once
we see the way that Plantinga's claims about proper basicality are linked to the no-
neutrality thesis, we can see a similarity to positions that do not claim that faith should be
basic. William Wainwright, for example, has articulated a form of evidentialism that sees
religious faith as based on reasons, but claims that it may be necessary for faith to be
present in an individual for that individual to grasp those reasons or see their force as
evidence (1995, 1–6). Such a view also implies that common ground as evidence that any
person may grasp is limited.
Faith above Reason
Given the finitude of human beings, it is hardly surprising that there might be truths about
a God who is infinite in power, knowledge, and love that we are unable to grasp through
our natural powers. Aquinas, for example, urges that “a created intellect cannot see the
essence of God unless God by his grace unites Himself to the created intellect, as an