that a human could not reasonably foresee would also constitute such evidence. Finally, if
an
end p.336
extraterrestrial were to show great technological prowess, such as being able to transport
a physical body instantaneously over a long distance, this would naturally suggest
superior cognitive power as well.
A theologian such as Aquinas maintains that we might have evidence that a revelation is
from God, a being with vastly superior cognitive powers, that is roughly analogous to this
kind of evidence. Aquinas says that we can come to see that the revelation is from such a
being in a variety of ways. Some of the truths contained in the alleged revelation might
be ones that we can independently confirm, and here the superiority of the revealer might
be evident in the manner in which the truths were known. Fulfilled prophecies could
show the existence of foreknowledge, and miracles and other signs could also be
evidence that the revelation is from a source that vastly exceeds human beings in power,
and therefore presumably in knowledge as well (1975, 71–73). It is worth noting in
passing that Aquinas also mentions the “inward instigation of the Holy Spirit” as the
source of a belief in the genuineness of a revelation, a claim that moves Plantinga to
enlist Aquinas in the roster of those who hold that a belief in the genuineness of a
revelation can be basic and not rooted in evidence (Plantinga 2000, 249).
Can a revelation from God enable human beings to acquire truths that human reason
could not acquire on its own? I see no a priori reason why this should not be possible.
There are a range of possibilities for the relation between such revealed truths and human
reason. Aquinas himself seemed to hold that reason can develop arguments for such
truths, but that the arguments can only reach probability and can never be conclusive
(1975, 77–78). Kant seems to hold the more radical position that theoretical reason
cannot investigate truths about God at all, for when it tries to do so, it falls into
contradictions (antinomies).
However, for both of these thinkers (and Kierkegaard as well), whatever truths that are
communicated must be in some way understandable. Aquinas deals with the general
problem of how we humans can conceive of God by affirming that positive predicates
can be applied to God analogically; when we say that God is good, we are not using the
term “good” exactly as we would when affirming that a creature is good, but the use is
not equivocal either, for there is a real relation between creaturely goodness and the
divine goodness that is its foundation. This view that predicates can apply to God
analogically does not apply only to revealed truths, but if it is viable it would seem
relevant to those higher truths as well.
Kant deals with the problem by affirming that reason does possess a pure Idea of God.
Though it is not a concept that can be put to empirical or scientific use, it is an Idea with
enough content that it can be put to practical use. For Kant, we need only understand the
concepts of God and life after death well enough to use them to guide our moral lives.
Kierkegaard follows Kant here in thinking that religious truths are essentially practical.
We do not need to understand God as a theoretical object, but we need to know how we
are to worship God, thank God, and be obedient to God's commands. For Kierkegaard,
the