morality. The metaphysical foundation of ethics has been problematic in modern ethics,
whereas theism offers a number of plausible accounts of that foundation. A couple of
these accounts are outlined in the next section.
The Metaphysical Ground of Morality
Western religions maintain that morality arises from God. Natural law theory makes
morality rest on God's nature. Divine Command theory makes morality rest on God's
will. The theory I call Divine Motivation theory makes morality rest on the motives that
are the primary constituents of God's virtues. In each case, the theory may not be
committed to the idea that morality needs religion, as it is possible that even though
morality in fact derives from God, morality would exist even if there were no God. But
clearly, if morality derives from God, it depends on God in actuality whether or not
morality would have existed in some other possible godless world. This is the view I
investigate briefly in this section.
Other than natural law theory, the principal theory of a theistic foundation for morality is
divine command theory. Divine command theory has a long and important history in
religious ethics, although it is often misunderstood. In my opinion, the major objections
to it can be answered and I will not discuss them in any detail. My own objections are
ones that apply to law-based theories in general. The alternative I prefer is a theory I call
divine motivation theory. This theory is Christian, but its structure permits variations both
for other religions and for secular ethics.
According to divine command (DC) theory, the divine will is the source of morality.
Many contemporary forms of DC theory limit the theory to an account of right and wrong
acts, not an account of moral value in general.^9 A common form of DC theory, then, is
the following: an act is morally required (an obligation) just in case God commands us to
do it; an act is morally wrong just in case God forbids us to do it; an act is permissible
just in case God neither commands nor forbids it. Because a divine command is the
expression of God's will with respect to human and other creaturely acts, the divine will
is the fundamental source of the moral properties of acts.
The nature of the relation between God's commands and moral requirements is an
important issue for DC theorists. To say that “x is morally required” means “x is
commanded by God” is too strong because it has the consequence that to say “x is
morally required because God commands it” is just to say “x is commanded by God
because x is commanded by God,” which clearly tells us nothing. On the other hand, to
say that God's commands and moral requirements are merely extensionally equivalent is
too weak. That is compatible with the lack of any metaphysical connection whatever
between the existence of moral properties and God's will, and it makes DC theory
uninteresting. DC theory, then, aims at something in between identity of meaning and
mere extensional equivalence. It
end p.356