their explanations of certain forms of human behavior through reflecting on the better
explanations offered by the other religion. Comparison might stimulate novel theoretical
developments within a religious tradition. A third possibility is the enrichment of
religious practice. The adherents of one religion might find in the other a practice of
prayer or meditation that could profitably be appropriated, perhaps with modifications,
and contribute to their own spiritual growth. Comparison might provide a religion with
practical resources it would not have developed on its own. Which of these constructive
possibilities become actual, if any do, will, of course, depend on the details of particular
comparisons that people make. There is no way of knowing a priori whether comparisons
will yield constructive fruits. But examples of comparisons that have recently been
worked out in some detail suggest that it is within our power to actualize some of the
constructive possibilities.
So these four philosophical issues arise from religious diversity. Let us examine each of
them more thoroughly.
A Familiar Problem: Epistemological Conflict
David Hume presents a special case of the epistemological challenge of religious
diversity in the famous discussion of miracles that is contained in the second part of
section 10 of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748/2000). Religious
believers cite miracles in support of their doctrinal claims, and they cite testimony as
evidence for the occurrence of these miracles. Hume argues that the miracles cited in
support of different religions must be regarded as contrary facts because the religions
they support are mutually inconsistent. Testimony to the miracles supporting different
religions is therefore conflicting testimony.
Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions (and
all of them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to
which it is attributed; so has it the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every
other system. In destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the credit of those
miracles, on which that system was established; so that all the prodigies of different
religions are to be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of these prodigies,
whether weak or strong, as opposite to each other. (32)
However, conflicting or opposite testimonies cancel each other out, other things being
equal; there is mutual destruction of evidential force. Thus, given religious diversity, the
evidential force of miracle reports is, other things being equal, destroyed by contrary
miracle reports.
There are, of course, objections to Hume's argument that have some force. His claim that
the miracles of different religions must be regarded as contrary facts can be called into
question. The miracles of different religions would not, for example, be contrary facts if
there were many gods, each of whom worked miracles on behalf of his or her
worshippers. Indeed, I suppose the God of the true religion might work miracles for the
adherents of a religion containing a mixture of truth and error if those adherents were for
some reason unprepared to receive the true religion and the miracles were needed to deter
them from adopting a particularly wicked cult of human sacrifice. But even if his