organism it is” can be understood in two ways. In the first, an organism's being the kind
of organism it is depends on the kind of organism its parents were. In the second, if
identity of genotype is a necessary condition for an organism's being this individual
rather than some other individual of the same species, then this individual organism owes
its existence to the historical event of that particular sperm cell meeting that particular
egg.
Theists will insist that there are no historical dependency relations to God's existence.
Greek myth provides Zeus with an ancestry, but nothing is supposed to correspond to that
with God. Nor do there appear to be any other kinds of historical relations on which God
depends. But if God's existence has no pedigree, it is hard to see how what God is, or
God's nature, could depend historically on anything either.
Turn now to contemporaneous dependency relations. Creatures with lungs depend
presently on an atmosphere rich in oxygen for their continued existence. Because the
presence of an atmosphere depends on the mass of the planet, creatures with lungs also
presently depend on the Earth's continuing to have sufficient mass. Here again theists will
claim that there are no conditions or states on which God depends for his continuing to
exist. There is no Kryptonite that can make God vulnerable, no cosmic spinach God must
consume in order to save the universe's Olive Oyls from the clutches of the universe's
Blutos.
end p.48
Structural and Contentful Dependency
A persistent critic might concede that there are no vulnerability conditions on which God
is dependent but insist that God is subject nevertheless to structural and contentful
dependency relations. Here is one way to understand the critic's point. Many philosophers
agree, partly or fully, with Locke about the identity of persons. Hardly anyone will demur
from Locke's characterization of a person as “a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason
and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times
and places” (1700/1975, 335). Locke's conception of a person attributes a partial structure
to a person's mind by ascribing to it some essential capacities, such as the capacities for
reason, self-awareness, and memory. Somewhat more controversial is Locke's criterion
for a person's identity through time. Locke thought that a person's identity through time
was a function of the person's experiential memory. Roughly, x and y are the same person
at different times if and only if x remembers experiencing something that y experienced.
What is experienced and hence what is remembered can vary enormously among persons
without the variation compromising their status as persons. Thus, Locke's theory of
personal identity provides ample room for the ascription of diverse mental content to
persons. Of course, one does not need to accept Locke's theory to believe we have all
sorts of diverse mental content. Persons, then, have parts or components that are
structurally essential to their being persons, but they also have mental states that are
accidental to their being persons.
The persistent critic's point is this. Theists insist that God is personal. In fact, for theists,
God would appear to pass Locke's criteria for personhood with flying colors. If so, then