In his dream argument, any feature of waking life we choose to distinguish it from
dreaming is promptly imagined to be in a dream. So how do we know that we are not
dreaming all the time? Alternatively, how do we know that we are not in the hands of a
malignant demon who deceives us even about the ways we distinguish between being and
not being deceived? So how do we know that we are not being deceived all the time? As
Barry Stroud (1991) has said, if we cannot answer Descartes' questions, we lose the
whole world; we lose the sense of things.^3
Descartes' questions led him to the one thing he could not doubt: his consciousness. The
window through which, or in which, Descartes “sees” human beings is not the familiar
window that looked out on the square, but the window of his own consciousness. He is
asking a question in logic: How can it mean anything to say that my consciousness is in
contact with reality?
Is there a feature of consciousness that guarantees that contact? It cannot be any of his
bodily characteristics, since Descartes thinks these may be simply part of a dream he is
having. Neither can it be his conviction of mathematical certi
end p.449
tude, since this may turn out to be a devil's ploy. It seems to Descartes that he needs
nothing less than proof of the existence of a God who is no deceiver: “For if I do not
know this, it seems that I can never be certain of anything else” (1990, 25). Suddenly,
Descartes realizes that he has, in his consciousness, an idea of such a God. And what an
idea it is! It is an idea than which no greater can be conceived, since it entails the
existence of the God it is an idea of. Descartes can exclaim, “O happy day! When all my
doubts have gone away.” Descartes logical perplexity is put to rest by the conviction that
he has found an Archimedean point, a realm beyond his familiar world, which provides a
logical foundation for our categories of thought.
Descartes' dilemma is: How, from inside my consciousness, can I make contact with a
reality outside it? Note the spatial metaphors for meaning which contribute to the idea
that we need a bridge from consciousness to reality. Wittgenstein attacked the terms of
reference of this dilemma: the Cartesian concepts of consciousness and reality.
Does this mean that Wittgenstein has no interest in the nature of reality? On the contrary,
he thinks it is philosophy's primary concern. He argues, however, that metaphysical
conceptions of reality obscure actual realities, including what is meant by the reality of
God. My aim in this essay is to put flesh on the bones of this assertion.
Philosophy of Religion's Epistemological Inheritance
For the most part, contemporary philosophers of religion do not complain about the
accuracy of the accounts of their views given by Wittgensteinians, whereas this is a
common complaint by Wittgensteinians about accounts given of their views. Why should
this be so? Most philosophers are content to say that theories they disagree with are
intelligible but false. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, says that the theories are the
product of confusion. It follows that someone in the grip of that confusion will not
appreciate the character of a critique of it. Wittgensteinians claim that in contemporary
philosophy of religion, that confusion is found in its epistemological inheritance. It is that
confusion which leads to many philosophers giving an epistemological caricature of
Wittgenstein's thought. Let us see how this comes about.