able is shown in the ways we think and act and, notably, in what we do not question.
Wittgenstein thinks that to seek a metaphysical underpinning for our practices, which will
show why what we regard as reasonable is reasonable, is to have thought chasing its own
tail. He does not give the same account of every certainty in our thinking and acting.
Some of them, for example, our certainty that every skull contains a brain, result,
initially, from a discovery, whereas our certainty that we live in a human neighborhood
does not.
Wittgenstein is saying, not that we cannot question certain things, but that we do not. To
say we cannot is to invoke some kind of metaphysical necessity that determines our
modes of thought and action. To wean us away from that thought, Wittgenstein asks us to
imagine certain fundamental changes taking place. Again, he does not treat them as
forming a class or give the same account of them all.
What if water froze when heated? No doubt we would be absolutely astonished. But
some explanation would be sought, and science would go on. More radically, what if the
same seeds led to the growth of different plants? Despite the most diligent research over
many years, no difference in the seeds is found. We could imagine that, gradually,
interest shifts from the seeds to the plants. Seeds would be identified by the plants that
grow from them. Biology would be revolutionized, but we can imagine inquiry of some
kind going on. But what if I could not be sure of my name, of the friends I have known
for many years, or of my familiar surroundings? What would “going on” mean? All my
yardsticks would be breaking up. I would think I was going insane. I would certainty not
say that I had made a mistake, albeit a rather large one! I would not be in a position to say
what is or what is not a mistake. The philosophical importance of the distinction between
“mistake” and “insanity” is missed by those who say that it is logically possible that we
are wrong, or mistaken, in any situation (Plantinga 2000, 334).
Wittgenstein's purpose, in these imaginings, is not prophecy. He is not asking, What
would happen if? In asking us to imagine fundamental changes, Wittgenstein is
underlining, not undermining our ways of thinking and acting. He is certainly not saying
that these ways are open to a postmodern conception of choice. On the contrary, he is
calling attention to what goes deep in our thinking, to what is not questioned in our
thinking, to what holds fast there, and does so by asking us to imagine these certainties
withdrawn.^12
end p.459
Religion and Reality
A fundamental worry may keep recurring. If Wittgenstein's emphasis is on the rootedness
of our concepts and certitudes in our practices, how can we believe in a God who is other
than the world? Does not that appeal to “otherness” show, after all, that religious belief
entails the very notion of a metaphysical foundation that Wittgenstein attacks throughout
his work?