12.Anderson briefly discusses the work of Marilyn McCord Adams (1986) and Eleonore
Stump (1993) in this regard (see Anderson 1998, 41–42).
13.It should be mentioned here that, since the appearance of their 1998 books, Jantzen
and Anderson have engaged in a number of published critical interactions on each other's
work: see, e.g., Anderson (2000) and Jantzen (2001).
14.Here she seemingly follows Lorraine Code's (1992) analysis; also see Coakley (1997,
605–6).
15.The adjustment of Quine's ship image (see Anderson 1998, x–xii, 12–13) actually
makes for some metaphorical strain when it is brought into relation with Kant's idea of
“the territory of pure understanding” as an island surrounded by a “wide and stormy
ocean” (11). Anderson reads the sea in Kant as stereotypically feminine, containing fluid
and tempestuous elements that cannot be constrained into masculinist reason. But she
also wants there to be feminist mariners on the new Neurathian epistemological ship.
16.Anderson's citations from Swinburne here are deeply telling: see Anderson (1998, 43–
44). Also, compare my similar points of criticism in Coakley (1997, 602). In Swinburne's
most recent work he has finally acceded to an inclusive use of pronouns; it is not clear to
what extent this indicates any substantial responsiveness to feminist critique.
17.On this point, see especially McDowell (1994) and Plantinga (2000, ch. 1).
18.See Anderson (1998, 81): “Ultimately objectivity is to be made strong by weighing all
evidence for or against a hypothesis including the systematic examination of background
beliefs.”
19.I develop this argument about gender “fluidity” (a view that owes much to the patristic
author Gregory of Nyssa) in Coakley (2002, ch. 9), and more fully in a forthcoming first
volume of “systematics”: God, Sexuality and the Self: An Essay “On the Trinity.”
20.The feminist epistemological essays in Alcoff and Potter (1993) note, among other
matters, the significance for initial cognitive competence of a child's intimate relationship
with a primary caregiver (32–39) and the importance of relational communities for
epistemic negotiations (121–29).
21.See Coakley (1997, 601–3).
22.See ibid., 603–5.
23.Harriet Harris (2001) has recently argued this broad point in more detail.
24.This point is argued in more detail in my 1999 Riddell Lectures, in preparation
end p.522
as Diotima and the Dispossessed: An Essay “On the Contemplative Life.” Anderson
gives a critical account of this aspect of my manuscript in her recent article, “Feminist
Theology as Philosophy of Religion” (2002, esp. 43–50).
25.See Coakley (1997, 606), where I suggest that “Bringing religious experience' to the bar of rationaljustification' mayappear as the modern counterpart of the male confessor's
hold over the medieval female saint's theological status and credibility.”
26.This issue is discussed at some length in my forthcoming God, Sexuality and the Self:
An Essay “On the Trinity.”
27.These themes are given a preliminary treatment in Coakley (2002, ch. 8), but are more
thoroughly treated in Diotima and the Dispossessed (see n. 24).