item depending on the G could depend on it so thoroughly that it could not exist without
the G's causal support. So via “perfect being” reasoning, we can conclude that whatever
in any way ought to inspire thanks and
end p.86
praise and coexists with a G depends so completely on it for existence that it could not
exist without the G.
Turning now to our G in W, @, again, contains many things warranting thanks and
praise. Either some of these also exist in W, or none do. Suppose that some do. Then if
the G does not exist in @, some things in W could have existed without depending on a
G's contribution to their existence. But we've just ruled this out. And so if a G exists in W
but not in @, nothing warranting thanks and praise in @ exists in W. If a G exists in W
but not in @, nothing in @ could have depended on that G. For if it did, in any world, it
would there depend on that G so completely that it could not exist without the G in any
world—including @. So if the G does not exist in @, everything in @ is such that that G
does not possibly account for its existence. If so, the G of W is not omnipotent: there are
perfectly possible contingent beings for whose existence it cannot account. Surely
omnipotence is great-making and exemplifiable; surely nothing can be a G without it. So
existence in @ follows from a clearly great-making property. This may well make
existing in @ great-making. In any case, on the present argument, nothing that does not
exist in @ can be a G in any world. And so any G in any world, including W, exists in @.
I submit, then, that the amended, free-logical version of Proslogion 2's argument is valid,
and one of its two premises has strong support.
Proslogion 3
In Proslogion 3, Anselm reasons that
something can be thought to be, which cannot be thought not to be. This is greater than
what can be thought not to be. Whence if that than which no greater can be thought, can
be thought not to be, itis not that than which no greater can be thoughtSo truly does
something than which no greater can be thought exist, therefore, that it cannot be thought
not to exist. (Charlesworth 1965, 118)
Some claim that here Anselm gives a second argument for God's existence. They do so
by reading Anselm this way:
- Possibly something is a G, and
- Being a G entails existing necessarily. So
- Possibly a G exists necessarily. So
- A G exists necessarily. So
- A G exists.
end p.87