for it asserts that if God does not exist, He is one. On such views, “there is” in “there is
something with all perfections which lacks a perfection” does not express existence. It is
instead a “wide” quantifier ranging over existent and nonexistent objects. To get a valid
argument with (18b), we must read (19) as
19b. There is something with all perfections which lacks a perfection entails a
contradiction.
But with the quantifier read “widely,” (19b) is false. On a Meinongian ontology, it is no
contradiction for there to “be” contradictory nonexistent objects. Such objects are
perfectly normal features of reality. What would be contradictory would be for one of
them to exist. So the (18)–(19) argument is unsound on two readings, and on a third has a
counterintuitive premise supporting which would require another, independent argument
for God's (necessary) existence. Let's therefore consider a different analysis.
Meditation V: Second Try
Med. V speaks of what we do and must suppose, that is, of what our idea of God
includes. Descartes later offered a “synthetic” presentation of material from his
Meditations, and as an argument to what he seems to claim is to the same effect as
Meditation V gave:
To say that something is contained in the nature or concept of anything is the same as to
say that it is true of that thing. But necessary existence is contained in the concept of
God. Hence it is true to affirm that necessary existence exists in Him, or God Himself
exists. (HR II 57)
Here the argument is in terms of concepts. There is also a reference to necessary
existence, which suggests a modal argument. But by “necessary existence” Descartes
means only actual existence the nature of the thing guarantees: that “actual existence is
necessarilylinked to God's other attributes” (HR II 20). So Descartes may here suggest
that the Med. V argument is really this:
- For all x, if being F is part of the concept of x, then Fx.
- It is part of the concept of God that if God's nature is what it is, God exists. So
- If God's nature is what it is, God exists.
- God's nature is what it is. So
- God exists.
end p.99
The problem here is that (21) is false. It's part of the concept of Santa that he has a beard,
but it's false that Santa has a beard, for it's false that anything really both is Santa and is
bearded. “Santa is bearded” doesn't say anything true. It is just the right thing to say if
you're telling Santa stories.
But perhaps (21) is dispensable. All Descartes really needs is
21a. For all x, if being F is part of the concept of God, then Fgod.