The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion

not existing, with a necessary being not having the possibility of not existing. The
arguments differ with respect to the type of existential fact that they select. For design
arguments it will be a fact that reports some natural object or process that displays design,
purpose, function, order, and the like. It might be the fact that there is life, self-replicating
organisms, consciousness, conscience, law-like regularity and simplicity, natural beauty,
and apparent religious miracles. In contrast, a cosmological argument's existential fact
does not have any of these sorts of valuable features. It might be the fact that there exists
a total aggregate of contingent beings (the universe), or maybe that there exists at least
one contingent being, or that one object depends on another for its existence.
The two types of argument also differ in the way they go from their initial contingent
existential fact to the existence of a supernatural God-like being who is the cause of this
fact. A cosmological argument, typically, demands a cause of this fact in the name of the
principle of sufficient reason (hereafter PSR), which is suitably tailored so that every fact
of this kind actually has an explanation. This is followed by an explanatory argument to
show that the only possible explanation for this fact is in terms of the intentional actions
of a God-like being. Thus, a cosmological argument standardly has the following three
components:

1.

A contingent value-neutral existential fact

2.

A version of PSR that requires that every fact of this kind has an explanation

3.

An explanatory argument to show that the only possible explanation of this fact is in

terms of the intentional actions of a supernatural, God-like being

In contrast, the typical design argument does not demand an explanation for the initial
contingent existential fact on the basis of some version of the PSR but instead employs
principles of inductive reasoning to infer that it is highly probable that this fact is caused
by a supernatural, God-like being. These principles might involve principles of analogical
reasoning or abductive inference (inference to the best explanation). Thus, the typical
design argument has the following three components:

1 ′. A contingent valuable existential fact
2 ′. Some principle of inductive reasoning
end p.117

3 ′.

An explanatory argument to show that the probable explanation of this fact is in terms

of the intentional actions of a supernatural, God-like being

It is important to stress that these components comprise only the typical design argument,
for there are versions of the design argument that do not employ 2′ and 3′. Some design